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Abstract
This thesis examines whether the litigation of the legal right to a healthy environment can
adequately advance the values of its supporters. This question is answered through examining
scholarly arguments in favour of the right, promotional material from Environmental NonGovernmental Organizations (ENGOs) litigating the right, court documents, as well as the results
of a select number of interviews with senior members of Canadian ENGOs. It is ultimately argued
that the intervention of lawyers and the interpretation of judges will narrow the intended scope of
the right. Additionally, it is argued that the act of choosing to litigate implicitly affirms the settler
state’s assumed authority over environmental governance in Canada. The narrowing of the scope
of the right would likely then result in the potential legal right not fully reflecting the values that
its proponents sought to advance, and thus would limit its efficacy.
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Chapter One: Introduction
“Strategic choices have costs.”1 This simple but inescapable reality lies at the heart of this
thesis. We are currently in the midst of a climate emergency. “Rapid, far-reaching, and
unprecedented changes in all aspects of society” will be required in order to adequately respond.2
In this context, it is easy to understand why responses theoretically offering rapid change would
find widespread support among people concerned about climate change.
I approach this work as a legally trained settler Canadian, living and working on
Anishinaabe land, seeking to use my training and position to contribute to efforts to address
climate change within the communities I belong to. One prominent approach within the
environmental law community is the ongoing effort to litigate the right to a healthy environment
as a means to address climate change. Like any strategic choice, the litigation of the right to a
healthy environment comes with costs. In this thesis I will examine the normative effects of
litigating the right to a healthy environment in Canada. More specifically I seek to explore
whether it is likely or possible for a potential right to a healthy environment to adequately
advance the values of that its proponents seek to advance in the context of climate change
litigation.
Ultimately, I argue that in the process of arriving at a right to a healthy environment as a
litigation strategy the interventions of lawyers and judges will narrow the intended scope of the
right. I contend that this narrowing would result in the proposed legal right not fully reflecting
the values its proponents sought to advance. This would limit its efficacy as a tool to combat

1

Gerald N Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? Second Edition, second edition
ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) at 423.
2
“Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C approved by governments —
IPCC”, online: <https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-globalwarming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/>.
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climate change and to promote ecological integrity more generally. I further argue that two major
risks result from this narrowing.
First, there is serious risk that a right to a healthy environment will be misinterpreted by
the non-legally trained public as a more substantive victory than is likely to be articulated by the
courts, especially in the context of climate change. This could have the unintended consequence
of leading those committed to fighting climate change to relax their efforts and instead rely on
the legal right to produce social change in lieu of building further social and political
movements.
Second, the strategic choice to litigate can foreclose work on other strategies to address
climate change. I argue the litigation of the right to a healthy environment detracts from
investment in efforts to transform relations between the settler state relationship and Indigenous
peoples, as well as relations with the Earth. Furthermore, forgoing such work in favour of
litigating has the unintended effect of implicitly reinforcing the settler state and its assumed
authority to deal with these issues.
The Right to A Healthy Environment Within the Canadian Context
In order to begin this analysis, I must first outline the origin and current state of the push
for the recognition of a right to a healthy environment in Canada.
There is ample evidence that Canada is not doing enough to protect the environment.
Despite having a relatively modest population, Canada is among the ten highest greenhouse gas
emitting countries in the world.3 Yale’s Environmental Performance Index evaluates Canada as
performing poorly in multiple indicators of ecosystem vitality, especially in relation to its efforts
3

By the Numbers: Canadian GHG Emissions, by Paul Boothe & Felix A Boudreault (London, ON: Lawrence
National Centre for Policy and Management: Ivey Business School at Western University, 2016).
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to preserve forests, fisheries, reduce air pollution, and addressing climate change and energy
use.4 Anishinaabe environmental law scholar Deborah McGregor, in an article cowritten with
environmental researchers Steven Whitaker and Mahisha Sritharan, argues that such deficiencies
are not newly occurring, but rather:
in the North American context, Indigenous peoples have arguably been concerned over
ecosystem destruction since the arrival of Europeans over five centuries ago, long before
dominant society officially recognized it as a crisis. From an Indigenous point of view,
environmental injustices, including the climate crisis, are therefore inevitably tied to, and
symptomatic of, ongoing processes of colonialism, dispossession, capitalism,
imperialism/globalization and patriarchy.5
Following from this connection McGregor, Whitaker, and Sritharan argue that “failure to apply
an analysis of historical and on-going colonialism to understand the depth and scope of
environmental injustices that are affecting Indigenous communities means remedies will
continue to fail.”6
As a result of Canada’s current position as an environmental laggard, much scholarly
analysis has been devoted to comparative analyses of legal systems which are perceived to be
more successful at protecting the environment.7 A significant outcome of engaging in these
comparative analyses has been increasing advocacy for environmental rights in Canada. This
advocacy has been primarily organized around the potential recognition of the right to a healthy
environment within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8

Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, “Environmental Performance Index: Canada”, online:
<https://epi.envirocenter.yale.edu/epi-country-report/CAN>.
5
Deborah McGregor, Steven Whitaker & Mahisha Sritharan, “Indigenous environmental justice and sustainability”
(2020) 43 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability (Indigenous Conceptualizations of ‘Sustainability’) 35–
40 at 36.
6
Ibid at 37.
7
For example this was the impetus behind Canadian environmental law scholar David Boyd’s 2011 book The
Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment which
serves as an important entry point to the advocacy for the right to a healthy environment in Canada.
8
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 16, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
4
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A Charter right to a healthy environment builds on the recognition that over 145
countries have “deliberately expressed their commitment to environmental protection through
constitutional changes in the past four decades.”9 This recognition led prominent Canadian
Environmental Law scholar David Boyd to publish two books on the topic including The
Environmental Rights Revolution (2011) which examines the effectiveness of the right to a
healthy environment in other jurisdictions,10 and The Right to a Healthy Environment:
Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution (2012) which argues for the implementation of the right to a
healthy environment in Canada.11 According to Boyd:
compared to nations whose constitutions are silent on green issues, nations with
environmental provisions in their constitutions have smaller ecological footprints,
perform better on comprehensive rankings of environmental performance, have reduced
air pollution much faster, are more effectively addressing climate change, and are more
likely to ratify international environmental treaties.12
Boyd argues that Canada should amend its constitution in order to strengthen its environmental
laws to be more in line with the nations who have been able to achieve these results. Boyd’s
preferred method for this would be to amend section 7 of the Charter to include:
7.1 Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment,
including clean air, safe water, fertile soil, nutritious food, and vibrant biodiversity.13
As an alternative Boyd additionally advocates for a more “comprehensive approach” and
provides a draft “Canadian Charter of Environmental Rights and Responsibilities”14 which

David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2012) at 196 [The Right to a Healthy Environment].
10
David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the
Environment (UBC Press, 2011) Google-Books-ID: iEYzN4bNQ3MC.
11
Boyd, supra note 7.
12
Ibid at 196-197.
13
Ibid at 197.
14
Ibid at 197-198.
9
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“could be incorporated into the existing Charter or added to the handful of documents that
collectively make up Canada’s constitution.”15
In the years since Boyd’s books were published there has been a significant amount of
scholarly discussion regarding the right to a healthy environment. In contrast to Boyd’s preferred
constitutional amendment strategy, these works mostly examine whether it would be possible to
have the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) judicially interpret a right to a healthy environment
into the “right to life” under section 7 of the Charter.16 Similar analyses have been undertaken in
regard to establishing the right under section 1517 and section 3518 of the Charter as well. Boyd
and Canadian Environmental Law scholar Lynda Collins have further argued for the necessity of
recognizing the right to a healthy environment in order to provide a “constitutional backstop”
which would prevent new governments from repealing laws to undo gains made by previous
governments in the realm of environmental protection.19 There have also been arguments that
litigating the right to a healthy environment may lead to a win-win scenario for environmental
activists. This argument is based on the idea that such litigation could lead to change even in the
event of a loss, as "a loss at trial...[could be framed as] a political victory for climate change

15

Ibid at 197.
Examples include: Nathalie Chalifour, “Environmental Justice and the Charter: Do environmental injustices
infringe sections 7 and 15 of the Charter?” (2015) 28 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 89 [Environmental
Justice and the Charter]; Nathalie J Chalifour & Jessica Earle, “Feeling the Heat: Climate Litigation under the
Canadian Charter’s Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of the Person” (2017) 4 Vt L Rev 689–770; Avnish Nanda,
“Heavy Oil Processing in Peace River, Alberta: a Case Study on the Scope of Section 7 of the Charter in the
Environmental Realm” (2015) 27:2 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice; Scarborough 109–140.
17
See for example: Chalifour, “Environmental Justice and the Charter”, supra note 14.
18
Examples include: Lynda Collins, “Safeguarding the Longue Durée: Environmental Rights in the Canadian
Constitution” (2015) 71:1 The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference,
online: <https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol71/iss1/20>; Andrew Stobo Sniderman & Adam
Shedletzky, “Aboriginal Peoples and Legal Challenges to Canadian Climate Change Policy” (2014) 2 W J Legal
Stud [i]-16.
19
Lynda M Collins & David R Boyd, “Non-Regression and the Charter Right to a Healthy Environment” (2016) 29
Journal of Environmental Law and Practice; Scarborough 285–304.
16
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activists-by framing climate change as a threat to rights and by requiring the government to
justify its ongoing failure to reduce Canada's greenhouse gas emissions."20
Although there is a general consensus in the literature cited above that a right to a healthy
environment would be useful, and that there is conceptual harmony between the proposed right
and existing sections of the Charter, the need to utilize resources such as time, money, political
will, and public commitment to fighting climate change poses a major barrier for the potential
recognition of the right. The issue becomes further complicated when considering the efficacy of
litigating for the right to a healthy environment as a strategy to specifically address climate
change. In his 2015 article “Filling the Gaps in Canada’s Climate Change Strategy: All
Litigation, All the Time,” Canadian environmental law scholar Cameron Jefferies argues the
“prospect of successfully closing the significant gaps in Canada's climate change strategy
through litigation is, at least for the time being, quite slim" and that "there is no panacea to the
complex and multi-faceted climate change problem."21 Another Canadian environmental law
scholar, Jason MacLean, has similarly stated that:
Concentrating strategic resources on advocating for a constitutional amendment or
prosecuting a strategic piece of Charter litigation is akin to the kind of "single-shot
'paradigmatic' solutions that (Kelly) Levin and her colleagues have identified as being
‘inadequate to generate the necessary momentum or levers for the transformations of
behavior and economic activity necessary to combat climate change.’22

20

Sniderman & Shedletzky, supra note 16 at 16.
Cameron Jefferies, “Filling the Gaps in Canada’s Climate Change Strategy: All Litigation, All the Time” (2015) 5
Fordham Int’l LJ 1371 at 1404.
22
Jason MacLean, “You Say You Want an Environmental Rights Revolution: Try Changing Canadians’ Minds
Instead (of the Charter)” (2017) 1 Ottawa L Rev 183–220 at 152 citing Kelly Levin et al, “Overcoming the tragedy
of super wicked problems: constraining our future selves to ameliorate global climate change” (2012) 45:2 Policy
Sci 123–152.
21
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Current Cases
Despite such critiques, the desire to achieve greater environmental protection through a
rights-based framework has persisted. This is most evident in the actions of Environmental NonGovernmental Organizations (ENGO’s). The strategic choice to litigate the right to a healthy
environment made by ENGOs are particularly important at the moment as three right to a healthy
environment cases have been launched in the year that I have spent writing this thesis
(September 2019-2020). Each case seeks to establish that the Canadian governments’ inaction on
climate change is infringing citizens’ Charter rights.
The first of these claims, La Rose et al. v Her Majesty the Queen, was issued by 15
Canadian youths with the support of the David Suzuki Foundation. The “legal basis” for the
claim, as outlined within the Plaintiffs’ statement of claim, consists of relief sought to address
damage done to the plaintiffs by climate change including: children and youth’s rights to life,
security of the person, and equality; and youth and future generations’ ability to access resources
“subject to a public trust.”23 The remedies sought within the claim specifically include an order
that the Federal government “be required to develop and implement an enforceable plan that is
consistent with Canada’s fair share of the global carbon budget necessary to achieve GHG
emissions reductions consistent with the protection of public trust resources subject to federal
jurisdiction and the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”24
A second similar litigation campaign, Mathur et al. v Ontario, was launched one month
later by Ecojustice on behalf of seven individuals, ages 12 to 23, from Ontario. These individuals
are described within the Notice of Application as “Ontario residents with genuine interests in

23
24

La Rose et al. v Canada (25 October 2019), Vancouver T-1750-19 (FC) (Statement of Claim at paras 223-248).
Ibid at para 9.
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preventing catastrophic climate change that will pose pervasive and serious risks to health and
wellbeing of those in their generation and future generations of Ontarians.”25 The claim, which
Ecojustice is dubbing as their “biggest climate lawsuit yet,” argues that the Ontario government’s
2030 emissions target is insufficient to meet “Ontario’s share of the minimum level of GHG
reductions necessary to limit global warming to below 1.5C above pre-industrial temperatures or,
in the alternative, well below 2C (i.e. the upper range of the Paris Agreement temperature
standard)” and therefore violates their clients’ section 7 Charter right to life.26 As a remedy to
this insufficient action the Applicants are requesting the court to order the provincial government
to “forthwith set a science-based GHG emissions target under s. 3(1) of the CTCA that is
consistent with Ontario’s share of the minimum level of GHG reductions necessary to limit
global warming to below 1.5C above pre-industrial temperatures or, in the alternative, well
below 2C (i.e. the upper range of the Paris Agreement temperature standard)”27 and to then
subsequently “revise its climate change plan under s. 4(1) of the CTCA once it has set a sciencebased GHG reduction target.”28 The Applicants are additionally seeking a declaration that:
ss. 3(1) and/or 16 of the CTCA, which repealed the Climate Change Mitigation and Lowcarbon economy Act, 2016, S.O. 2016, c. 7 and allowed for the imposition of more
lenient targets without mandating that they be set with regard to the Paris Agreement
temperature standard or any kind of science-based process, violates sections 7 and 15 of
the Charter in a manner that cannot be saved under s. 1, and is therefore of no force and
effect.29
Finally, two Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs, with the support of the RAVEN Trust are
bringing a legal challenge which “argues that Canada’s failure to do its fair share to avert a

25

Mathur et al. v Ontario (25 November 2019), Toronto CV-19-0063/627-0000 (ONSC) (Notice of Application at
para 9).
26
Ibid at para 8(f)).
27
Ibid at para 8(f)
28
Ibid at para 8(g).
29
Ibid at para 8(d).
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climate catastrophe would breach the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”30 Thus, the litigants are arguing that “Canada has a
constitutional duty to protect its citizens from climate catastrophe.” 31 The goal of establishing
that such a duty exists would be to force “a comprehensive overhaul of Canada’s environmental
legislation to enable urgent action on climate change.”32 Such an overhaul would draw “a line
against reckless fossil fuel developments that will push us past the tipping point.” 33 To that end
the pending litigation will specifically name “Coastal Gas Link and Pacific Trails fracked gas
pipelines along with LNG export facilities in Kitimat as particularly high-emitting fossil fuel
projects that are likely to breach Canada’s (already inadequate) emissions targets.”34
It is necessary to recognize here that these three cases are most closely related through
their focus on the impacts of climate change, and their desire to have Canadian governments’
climate change plans align with the goals set out in the Paris Agreement. At no point within the
filed court documents, or the Wet’suwet’en press release, is there an explicit reference to seeking
to establish a right to a healthy environment. Furthermore, it is arguable that climate change is a
fundamentally different issue than what Boyd was originally arguing for in seeking a right to a
healthy environment as climate change is an issue that cannot be bounded to place.
However, within this thesis I am presenting these climate change cases as an extension of
the argument for the right to a healthy environment. The primary argument for this functional
equivalency is that all three cases are framed primarily or exclusively in relation to the impacts
of climate change on humans, specifically with regard to human health under section 7 and

“Stand Strong for Wet’suwet’en Yintah”, online: RAVEN <https://raventrust.com/wetsuweten/>.
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
30
31
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equality rights under section 15 of the Charter. In this way although the impact and scope of
climate change is in some ways fundamentally different to that of other issues threatening
ecological integrity, the core legal focus remains on the human experience of these
environmental impacts rather than on the nature of the ecological impacts themselves. Thus,
success in any of these cases, although only immediately applied specifically to the impacts of
climate change, serve as a legal precedent that the Canadian government has a duty to abstain
from action that would degrade ecological integrity in a manner that would affect the health or
equality rights of Canadians. This interconnectedness is echoed within Ecojustice’s messaging as
well, as in their press release announcing the Mathur case they stated that “safe climate and
healthy environment are the very basis of the long, full lives [the claimants] intend to lead.”35
Thus, due to this interrelatedness and strategic similarity, I treat climate change and the right to a
healthy environment litigation as interchangeable within this thesis.
The Impact of the Legacy of Settler Colonialism
La Rose and Mathur are each being supported by settler-founded ENGOs (through
receiving funding and legal counsel from the David Suzuki Foundation and Ecojustice
respectively). Each of these cases also directly involve Indigenous plaintiffs. As a result, and as
detailed below in the literature review, the relationship between these organizations, the plaintiffs
they are representing or funding, and the state will be shaped by settler colonialism. Indeed, any
meaningful attempt to address climate change must address the roots of ecological crises in
settler colonialism and capitalism.

Devon Page, “Seven young people from Ontario are suing Premier Ford”, (26 November 2019), online: Ecojustice
<https://www.ecojustice.ca/gen-climate-action-our-biggest-climate-lawsuit-yet/>.
35
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Thus while Indigenous representation amongst the class of plaintiffs is important, and
there may be a range of reasons individual Indigenous youth have joined these actions, it remains
nonetheless important to critically consider how the claims may shape the Canadian state’s
response to climate change impacts on Indigenous communities. As detailed below, in chapter
four, the current litigation is not designed to confront the ongoing legacy of settler colonialism in
partnership with Indigenous peoples, or to recognize their jurisdiction to make decisions about
their lands and health.36 Rather, it is reinforces the role of the Canadian state – at best
minimizing damage to Indigenous peoples as it exercises its presumptive authority. The choice to
litigate can then have the unintended yet harmful effect of legitimating the settler state’s
authority to decide not only how this damage will be addressed but environmental governance
more broadly. As a result, if successful, the potential right to a healthy environment will be
implemented through relationships which are fundamentally embedded in settler colonialism. In
effect the litigants are asking the court, a body representative of the settler colonial systems
responsible for the alleged harm, to unilaterally deliver a solution which can undo the harm. I
note this at the outset because this colonial nature of litigation in Canadian courts will
fundamentally impact the expression and efficacy of any rights derived from these cases. This
context therefore necessarily underlies all of the analysis that is to follow in this thesis.
Overview
I develop the arguments presented at the beginning of this chapter by first consolidating
the available research in multiple strains of scholarships. I first examine scholarship outlining
relational approaches to law, which I in turn connect to scholarship concerning the insidious

36

Such jurisdiction has been the topic of considerable scholarly treatment, specifically within Land Back literature.
For a comprehensive overview of such work see Yellowhead Institute, Land Back: A Yellowhead Institute Red
Paper (Toronto: Ryerson University, 2019).
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nature of settler colonialism within the Canadian legal system. I then review literature regarding
two key sites of intervention during the process of litigation: the involvement of lawyers, and
judicial interpretation.
Following this literature review, my analysis explores how the lawyers involved in the
litigation of the right to a healthy environment may significantly narrow the scope of the values
that proponents of the right to a healthy environment intend to advance. I then explain how
judges may be unwilling and unable to provide proactive remedies to compel the state to
redistribute resources in the manner that is necessary to address climate change. Further, I argue
judges may avoid making broad declarations that Canadians do not have a right to a healthy
environment in order to avoid public questioning about the role of the courts. I argue that instead
judges will likely recognize a right to a healthy environment with limited remedial capabilities, a
result which will likely be mistaken as a success by members of the public who were committed
to the litigation strategy, which in turn may undermine social and political movements to address
climate change. Finally, in my concluding thoughts I reflect on how litigating the right to a
healthy environment may not address the interrelated impacts of settler colonialism and climate
change, and instead may distract from other efforts to do so.

13

Chapter Two: Literature Review
In this chapter I present relational approaches to law as an overarching frame that I will
be using to guide my analysis throughout the rest of this thesis. I detail how the relational
approach is an effective framework to guide this research as it provides a coherent structure
through which to both examine the potential impact of attempting to advance values through the
Canadian legal system, and to hypothesize alternative interventions that could more adequately
represent those same values.
I then turn my attention to scholarship detailing two key stages of arriving at a legal right
which introduce new actors, concerns, and interests which may fundamentally change the range
of values that a legal right ultimately protects: the intervention and influence of lawyers, and the
ultimate judicial interpretation of the legal right.
Relational Approaches and the Legacy of Settler Colonialism
The Charter and thus much of Canadian law is framed in terms of rights held against the
state. However, As Canadian constitutional law scholar Andrew Petter argues, this is the result of
a choice about how the Canadian legal system should be organized.37 Choosing the rights frame
has consequences. In the aptly named Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy,
and Law Jennifer Nedelsky offers a relational theory of the self, autonomy, and law as an
alternative to this prevailing Anglo-American individualistic theory.38 Nedelsky’s relational
theory posits that the individual self is “constituted in an ongoing, dynamic way by the
relationships through which each person interacts with others” and that “the values that people

Andrew Petter, “Immaculate Deception: The Charter’s Hidden Agenda” (1987) 45 Advocate (Vancouver) 857 at
861.
38
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford University Press,
2012).
37
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experience as central to their selfhood, to the possibility of their flourishing, are made possible
through relationships.”39 As such, Nedelsky identifies that it is necessary to “shift habits of
thought so that people routinely attend to the relations of interconnection that shape human
experience, create problems, and constitute solutions.”40 In order to do this Nedelsky makes a
distinction between values and rights. “Values”, she argues, are abstract articulations of what a
society sees as essential to humanity. Rights on the other hand, according to Nedelsky, are
“institutional and rhetorical means of expressing, contesting, and implementing such values.”41
She argues that relationships bridge abstract values and legal rights, and that the goal of rights is
to foster relationships which advance our values.42
Although the focus of Law’s Relations is on human relationships, the relational theory is
directly applicable to relationships beyond those between humans. According to Nedelsky “[t]he
very concept of ecology is relational. It is about fundamental interdependence.”43 In order to
demonstrate this, Nedelsky points to Thomas Berry’s influential book The Dream of the Earth,
wherein Berry argues that in order to achieve greater environmental protection we must engage
in a “complete reorientation in how we see the world and our place in it.”44 Nedelsky further
argues that “the dominant myths, institutions, and academic disciplines currently fail to provide
the necessary respectful, relational perspective,” and instead proposes that a shift to her relational
paradigm would invite “the kind of relational thinking that will promote a respectful relation to
earth and her many life-forms.”45

39

Ibid at 3.
Ibid.
41
Ibid. At 236-241
42
Ibid at 236.
43
Ibid at 12.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
40
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Nedelsky’s focus on relationships exposes a fundamental problem with comparative
environmental law. As detailed above, environmental rights have seen success elsewhere in the
world.46 However, the European countries pioneering these rights were able to tailor the right
such that existing relationships were capable of fostering the desired values. Simply applying
these rights to the Canadian context without attenuating for the unique relationships that the
Canadian state has with the public and the Earth may rely on relationships which cannot advance
the values proponents hope the right will advance.
A major difference between the European context and the Canadian context, is that any
interaction between the Canadian state and the Earth carries with it the legacy of settler
colonialism. This importance of this legacy is well documented in the work of Anishinaabe legal
theorists Deborah McGregor, Aaron Mills, and John Borrows.47 McGregor explains that “for
Native people, environmental justice is about colonization and racism, and not only about
continued assaults on the environment.”48 McGregor further argues that “because of their
intimate relationship with the land, any injustice to Aboriginal people is an environmental
injustice to the extent that it impairs the ability of Aboriginal people to fulfil their responsibilities
to Creation. Conversely, any injustice to the environment that impedes the ability of Creation to
fulfil its duties to Aboriginal people is an injustice to Aboriginal people.”49 Due to this
interrelatedness it is not possible for settlers to relate to the land without simultaneously
engaging in relations with Indigenous peoples. Mills echoes this line of thinking by arguing that

46

Boyd, supra note 9.
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“colonialism isn’t merely a process of newcomer settlement and Indigenous displacement; it’s a
mode of relationship between settler peoples, Indigenous peoples, and land in which all are
harmed (albeit certainly not equally).”50 Finally Borrows elucidates this logic in Earth-Bound:
Indigenous Resurgence and Environmental Reconciliation in which he argues that:
Reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the [Canadian] Crown requires our
collective reconciliation with the earth. Practices and partnerships of resurgence and
reconciliation must sustain the living earth and our more-than-human relatives for future
generations. This will not occur without the simultaneous resurgence of Indigenous laws,
governments, economies, education, relations to the living earth, ways of knowing and
being, and treaty relationships.51
This interrelatedness is further illustrated by the inextricable connection between the
legacy of settler colonialism and the efficacy of the Canadian state’s environmental efforts. In
their 2019 study, Richard Schuster and his colleagues conducted a comprehensive analysis of
vertebrate biodiversity on Indigenous managed lands, as well as state protected lands (i.e.
national and provincial parks) in Canada, Australia, and Brazil. The study determined that
vertebrate biodiversity is higher on Indigenous managed lands than in state protected areas in all
three countries.52 This study represents a particularly salient illustration of the efficacy of placebased Indigenous knowledge developed through living on and caring for this land from time
immemorial.
Schuster and colleagues suggest that “collaborative agreements with Indigenous land
stewards may be essential to insure persistence of many species in future, and to meet
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[Convention on Biological Diversity] goals to prevent extinction in Australia, Brazil and
Canada.”53 Taken together with McGregor’s argument that any injustice to the land is an
injustice to Indigenous peoples and vice-versa, it becomes clear that in order to be efficacious,
efforts to promote ecological integrity in Canada must in part be expressed through the
relationship between Indigenous peoples, the settler state, and the land. The task to adequately
address Canada’s contributions to climate change then becomes more clear, but no less daunting,
when applying this to logic the current climate crisis. As detailed at the beginning of this thesis
climate change is “invariably tied to, and symptomatic of, ongoing processes of colonialism,
dispossession, capitalism, imperialism/globalization and patriarchy;”54 processes which
fundamentally colour the current relationship of the settler state, Indigenous peoples, and the
land.
The applicability of a relational approach to environmental rights is further supported by
the example of New Zealand’s Te Urewera (2014) and Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims
Settlement) (2017) Acts, which conferred legal personality to a (former) national park and a river
respectively.55 Despite the fact that Canadian analysts have upheld these Acts as paragons of the
“rights of nature movement,”56 the impetus for recognition was not based in a desire to spur or
recognize such a hypothetical movement. In canvassing the history and process of implementing
the Acts, Katherine Sanders determined that the intent and application of these Acts were not
based on the abstract concept of legal personality and the rights of nature, but were rather a
method of reframing the unique relationship between the Crown, the Maori iwi, and the land
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itself.57 Thus, these Acts can be seen to be more indicative of the possibility of engaging with
relational conceptions of law in order to solve social problems. As such, much can be learned
about what the final outcomes of environmental rights litigation in Canada by examining the
degree to which it engages, or fails to engage, with repairing relationships that are fundamentally
tainted by the legacy of settler colonialism.
I have chosen to adopt this relational frame due to its ability to provide both an evaluative
criteria for legal rights, and also a concrete example of how to move forward while addressing
the issues at the core of Canada’s response to climate change and other issues of ecological
integrity. As such the relational frame will be used throughout chapter four and five to evaluate
how the input of lawyers and judges impacts how the values of proponents of the right to a
healthy environment are ultimate expressed within the legal right. I will then continue to use the
relational frame in the concluding chapter to examine other potential climate change
interventions that have the potential to directly protect ecological values.
The Effect of Environmental Litigation
Following Nedelsky’s argument that legal rights are “institutional and rhetorical means of
expressing, contesting, and implementing” broadly held values58 the body of this thesis will be
used to examine what the impact of institutional influences will be on whether the legal
mechanism of the right to a healthy environment effectively promotes the values its proponents
seek to advance. In order to undertake this analysis this thesis will examine two important
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interventions within a legal dispute which introduce new actors and sets of interests: the
involvement or lawyers, and judicial interpretation.
The Role of Lawyers and Advocates
Environmental rights litigation in Canada has recently been criticized by scholars for its
lack of community orientation. In his critique of the use of Charter litigation to address climate
change Jefferies argues, "we must remain focused on the actions that can be taken individually,
or as members of a larger community."59 MacLean comes to a similar conclusion while
examining the limitations of using the Charter to address climate change: "the strategic question
for environmental law and policy reform, then, is how to enhance public demand for and
participation in policymaking -future pathways - actually capable of enhancing environmental
protection, mitigating climate change, and promoting sustainability."60
Significantly, these deficiencies in broader community engagement may be the result of
the nature of litigating and having lawyers take a leading role in environmental activism. In
“Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the Production of Space” American legal
geographers Deborah G. Martin, Alexander W. Scherr, and Christopher City make the argument
that through the act of lawyering, lawyers play a crucial role in reinforcing or altering spatial
norms.61 The authors provide four dimensions of lawyers’ activities which produce this result, a
heuristic which I have incorporated into my data analysis, as discussed in chapter four below.
The first of these dimensions occurs when “lawyers translate meaning from one form to
another,” by narrowing “the meaning of the original data, limiting it to what particular legal rules
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or processes recognize as useable.”62 A second dimension is seen in how “lawyers may not only
translate, but also transform the meaning of the conflict.”63 According to the authors this
transformation occurs in two manners: (1) through the lawyer adding “meanings embedded in
the societal norms underlying law and legal process” while assessing “how legal rules and
processes affect the concerns at play;” and (2) by introducing the lawyer’s own values into the
conflict while filtering “information through the lens of their own values, values grounded in the
spatialities of lawyers’ lives.”64
The third action the authors identify is the process of lawyers acting as “agents,
introducing both role separation and transactional cost into potential resolutions.”65 The authors
describe ‘role separation’ as the “notion that lawyer and client exist within different networks of
concerns, relationships and motivational realities,” meaning that “a lawyer will have
commitments and concerns separate from the client” which are “inherently spatial, affecting how
lawyers interpret and enact a client’s claims.” The role as agent furthermore “introduces
increased transactional costs” including “both money and delay” which can “have a significant
impact on the parties’ choices.66 For example, lawyers working for an ENGO will be receiving
their income from donors to the ENGO as opposed to the plaintiffs themselves. This introduces a
role separation as the lawyer will have added responsibilities to the ENGO and donors, groups
that the plaintiffs would not have contact with otherwise. This in turn will change how the
lawyers approach the dispute.
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Finally, the authors observe that “lawyers exert power” both implicitly and explicitly.
The implicit effect occurs through the inclusion of lawyers altering the power dynamics of a case
because “as a member of a community elite, a lawyer’s status and access seems likely to alter the
existing social dynamics between other participants.” The explicit contribution occurs through
the intentional exertion of lawyers “through conscious, planned interventions, towards an
outcome desired by one or more participants,” which results in lawyers’ strategic choices having
a profound impact on the conflict.67
Taken together these four dimensions of lawyering demonstrate that in order for lawyers
to effectively assist in community led (rather than lawyer designed) movements, they will need
to critically and consciously operate in a different manner than the typical model of lawyering.
Not engaging in this critical work may inevitably lead them to translate and transform spatial
issues into conceptual ones and place themselves in a position of privilege within the conflict.
While Making Law, Making Place brings our attention to the broad impacts of a lawyers
involvement in a dispute, British-Canadian legal geographer Nicholas Blomley’s concept of
bracketing explains how and why lawyers make the individual decisions which come to define
disputes in the manner that Martin et al. identify. Blomley explains bracketing as the “attempt to
stabilize and fix a boundary within which interactions take place more or less independently of
their surrounding context. That which is designated as inside the boundary must be, in some
senses, disentangled from that identified as outside. Bracketing, in this broad sense, is a
ubiquitous and seemingly inescapable dimension of experience and perception.”68 Blomley
further states that “although it is endemic to social life, bracketing takes on a particular force
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within law.” Blomley establishes this claim based on the arguments that “law is particularly
invested in producing clarity, legibility, and certainty through the drawing of distinctions,” and
that due to its “institutionalization, law is a powerfully performative site.”69
Blomley additionally details legal practice as being responsible for creating bracketed
spaces of “extralegality” through “temporal moves, such as the designation of issues as pre- or
postlegal, or by their treatment as supralegal (that is, treating them as legally exogenous, beyond
law’s grasp) or infralegal (characterizing them as marginal, incidental, and unworthy).”70 This
process however is not a “simplification (for it is often highly complicated)” or “an abstraction
(as opposed to a contingent rearrangement of certain connections, entailing both cuts and
connections).”71 Rather, “the disentanglement that the legal bracket requires can be violent and
disruptive. Bracketing, therefore, can become a political and ethical battle zone.”72
Shin Imai’s description of his experience of practicing law in Moosonee, Ontario,
provides a concrete example to tease out the political implications of the practice of bracketing.
Imai describes originally approaching treaty rights cases in terms of “legal principles found in
court cases and legislation,” while his clients in the community were more focused with
discussing “the right to Aboriginal sovereignty.”73 This disconnect led some people at the
meetings to “look at [him] suspiciously, like [he] was an agent of the government.”74 Imai
explains the disconnect as being the result of “being taught to structure reality” while he was
being taught law in school. Imai further states that “In Moosonee, by dissecting a treaty rights
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dispute and organizing its components into legal categories, I was promoting the structure of
reality that I had been taught in downtown Toronto.”75
The disconnect that Imai identifies neatly fits into Blomley’s theory of bracketing, as
Imai was responsible for categorizing the concerns of the community regarding sovereignty as
extralegal. Imai’s further analysis demonstrates that while bracketing the dimensions of the legal
dispute he was not merely simplifying or abstracting the law, but rather unintentionally engaging
in a highly political act of favouring the structure of reality taught in law schools in comparison
to the reality experienced by the community of Moosonee.
Beyond providing an instructive example of what not to do while working with
communities as a lawyer, Imai also sets out a framework of skills necessary for lawyer to play a
positive role in working with communities. The framework which Imai refers to as a “counterpedagogy for social justice” involves three skills: collaborating with a community, recognizing
individuality, and taking a community perspective.76 According to Imai, in order to foster a
collaborative environment, lawyers must not position themselves as experts, but rather “establish
a less hierarchical structure which facilitates interaction by everyone involved.”77 The need to
approach environmental lawyering in this manner has been prominently advocated for by
American environmental lawyer Luke Cole who argued that “in a very real way, the legal groups
are re-creating one of the roots of environmental injustice – the making of decisions by people
not affected by those decisions.”78 Imai’s framework provides a promising means to avoid
perpetuating this root of environmental injustice. According to Imai in order to properly
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recognize individuality Imai suggests that lawyers need to foster a collaborative process which
acknowledges “personal identities, race and individual emotional engagement as an integral part
of problem-solving.”79 Lastly, lawyers taking a community perspective involves beginning “from
the reality perceived by the communities which they represent” and using “law as a tool for
advancing community goals, not as a blueprint for re-constructing community realities.”80
Taken together then, the theories detailed above (the four dimensions from Making Law,
Making Place; the concept of bracketing; and the counter-pedagogy for social justice) work to
provide a framework for analysis to examine the impact lawyers have on transforming and
translating community issues, deciding which concerns in a dispute are extralegal, and what
lawyers would need to do to meaningfully engage with community work. In chapter four I apply
the framework to the current right to a healthy environment cases to determine whether that
litigation follows the patterns that these authors have observed.
Interests of Judges and Courts
In his seminal book The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?,
American political scientist and legal scholar Gerald Rosenberg examines “whether, and under
what conditions, courts can produce significant social reform.”81 In answering this question
Rosenberg puts forth a theory of the “Constrained Court” and tests the theory against historical
analyses of attempts to use American courts to “produce significant social reform in civil rights,
abortion, women’s rights, the environment, reapportionment, criminal rights, and same-sex
marriage.”82 Rosenberg’s theory of sets out three constraints that need to be overcome in any
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case for American courts to be able to act as “effective producers of social reform.” In order to
satisfy these constraints one must observe that in:
1) Overcoming Constraint I [the limited nature of constitutional rights], there is ample legal
precedent for change; and,
2) Overcoming Constraint II [the lack of judicial independence], there is support for change
from substantial numbers in Congress and from the executive; and,
3) Overcoming Constraint III [the judiciary’s lack of powers of implementation], there is
either support from some citizens, or at least low levels of opposition from all citizens;
Additionally, Constraint III is mediated by the need for one of four conditions to be present:
a) Positive incentives are offered to induce compliance (Condition I); or,
b) Costs are imposed to induce compliance (Condition II); or,
c) Court decisions allow for market implementation (Condition III); or,
d) Administrators and officials crucial for implementation are willing to act and see court
orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources or for hiding behind (Condition IV).83
According to Rosenberg, historical analyses of key litigation84 demonstrated that determining
whether these three constraints are overcome, and at least one of one of four conditions are met,
best captures “the capacity of the courts to produce significant social reform.”85 This conclusion
is based in part on the finding that the American courts depend on political support to produce
reform.86 Rosenberg additionally argued that American courts cannot produce change if there is
resistance because they do not have the power to implement change given resistance.87 Finally
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Rosenberg observed that existing precedent for change, as well as support from within the legal
culture itself, was “the chief reason” that major legal cases were won.88
Following from the analysis of the conditions necessary for social reform Rosenberg
concludes that:
U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform. At best,
they can second the social reform acts of the other branches of government. Problems that
are unsolvable in the political context can rarely be solved by courts. As Scheingold puts
it, the “law can hardly transcend the conflicts of the political system in which it is
embedded” (Scheingold 1974, 145). Turning to courts to produce significant social reform
substitutes the myth of America for its reality. It credits courts and judicial decisions with
a power that they do not have.89 [emphasis added]
Based on this conclusion Rosenberg contemplates the consequences of investing in litigation for
those seeking significant social reform:
strategic choices have costs, and a strategy that produces little or no change and induces
backlash drains resources that could be more effectively employed in other strategies. In
addition, vindication of constitutional principles accompanied by small change may be
mistaken for widespread significant social reform, inducing reformers to relax their efforts.
In general, then, not only does litigation steer activists to an institution that is constrained
from helping them, but also it siphons off crucial resources and talent, and runs the risk of
weakening political efforts.90 [emphasis added]
Rosenberg concludes, “courts are not all-powerful institutions. They were designed with severe
limitations and placed in a political system of divided powers. To ask them to produce significant
social reform is to forget their history and ignore their constraints. It is to cloud our vision with a
naive and romantic belief in the triumph of rights over politics.”91
Rosenberg is not alone amongst legal scholars in his concern that litigation can weaken
political efforts. While Rosenberg describes this concern in terms of the capacity of judicial
decisions to simultaneously mobilize opponents of social change while fostering complacency
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amongst proponents,92 American legal historian Reva Siegel has examined another dimension of
this phenomenon. In her article “The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy”
Siegel formulates a theory of “preservation through transformation.”93 According to Siegel the
dynamic of “preservation-through-transformation” can be:
characterized in any way that indicates that elements of continuity and change are at stake
in the process. A status regime is modernized (or deformalized) when, despite changes in
its rules and rhetoric, it continues to distribute material and dignitary privileges ("social
goods") in such a way as to maintain the distinctions that comprise the regime (e.g.,
constitute "race" or "gender") in relatively continuous terms.94
Siegel uses the example of chastisement laws in the United States to demonstrate how
“preservation-through-transformation” occurs. Siegel traces how notions of companionate
marriage discredited the idea that men had legal entitlement to physically chastise their wives,
leading courts to reject arguments in favour of such an entitlement.95 However, while courts
began to repudiate the rationale of male prerogative to chastisement, they began to invoke a
“supplementary rationale” of marital privacy which would prevent the court from intervening to
stop chastisement.96 Thus although the courts repudiated the idea of prerogative chastisement,
the courts in effect preserved the ability for men to chastise their wives by transforming the
debate into one about the desirability of the court interfering with marital privacy.
Siegel argues that “civil rights reform may enhance the legal system's capacity to
legitimate residual social inequalities among status-differentiated groups.”97 In the marital
chastisement example it is clear that the repudiation of men’s prerogative to chastise their wives
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was an alleviation of some “dignitary or material aspects” of the unequal marital relationship.
However, the transformation of the issue into one of marital privacy allowed the court to
preserve the status differential while realigning the rationale for the differential back in line with
societal norms. Both Siegel and Rosenberg highlight a concern that even where litigation is
successful groups seeking social change can be indisputably worse off “in their capacity to
achieve further, welfare-enhancing reform of the status regime in which they were
subordinated.”98
Although both Rosenberg and Siegel conducted their research in the American context,
their conclusions are applicable to the Canadian context. In her 2012 article “Dollars Versus
[Equality] Rights” Hester Lessard examined the history of SCC cases dealing with section 15 of
the Charter from 1982 to 2012, and found similar results to what Rosenberg observed in the
American context.99 In the article Lessard categorizes cases based on whether the budgetary
impact of recognition was ‘minimal’ or ‘serious’. Lessard found that no section 15 challenge
with a ‘serious’ budgetary impact had been successfully litigated at the SCC, leading her to
conclude that “a minimal budgetary impact is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a
successful social benefit challenge under section 15, while a serious budgetary impact poses a
serious, if not impossible, hurdle.”100 Lessard further found that the reasons given for rejecting
the claims with a serious budgetary impact were typically focused on concerns of institutional
limitations in which the judges believed they had a “lack of institutional competence to make
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complex budgetary decisions,” and that "decisions with a significant budgetary impact lie outside
the appropriate constitutional role of the judicial branch in relation to the legislative branch.”101
Lessard’s data while concerning, was not unpredictable as even in the early days of the
Charter critics argued that such a pattern would develop. In his 1987 article Immaculate
Deception: the Charter’s hidden agenda Canadian constitutional law scholar Andrew Petter
observed that the members of the Canadian judiciary, who are recruited exclusively from a class
of successful and wealthy lawyers, do not “possess the experience, the training, or the disposition
to comprehend the social impact of claims made to them under the Charter, let alone to resolve
those claims in ways that promote or even protect, the interests of lower income Canadians.”102
Petter further argues that this is problematic because “the attitudes of lawyers and judges tend to
reflect the values of the legal system in which they were schooled and to which they owe their
livelihood,” a system which creates a shared assumption among lawyers that property rights
“flow from a natural system of private ordering.”103 Allan Hutchinson, another prominent
Canadian constitutional law scholar, demonstrates the problem with this type of pattern while
tackling the myth that the court engages in objective interpretation. To Hutchinson “Charter
adjudication is not about the objective interpretation of constitutional rules and their
dispassionate application to a given sets of social facts. Rather judicial decision-making
necessarily requires the courts to engage in ideological disputation.”104 The consequence of this

101

Ibid.
Petter, “Immaculate Deception”, supra note 37 at 861.
103
Ibid at 861–862.
104
Allan C Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: a critique of law and rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995)
at 714.
102

30

is that “the only consensus that may and does shape the work of courts is that among the
community of legal elites.”105
A consequence of these trends, Petter argues, is that “deep in the judicial ethos there
exists a special concern and reverence for property rights – a concern and reverence that over the
course of time will guide and constrain judicial decision-making in Charter cases.”106 It is this
ideological reverence for property rights which can predict Lessard’s findings, as that data
reflects that Canadian judges have a concern for property rights (i.e. the distribution of wealth)
which constrains them from ruling in such a way that Charter rights will obscure that perceived
“natural system of private ordering.” Thus, Lessard’s data when supported by the Petter and
Hutchinson’s explanations suggest that the Canadian courts are constrained from leading social
change in a similar way to what Rosenberg and Siegel observed in the American context.
The potential issues with the nature of the Charter and the Canadian legal system goes
beyond the predispositions of judges. In fact, the bulk of decisions that are made which effect
ecological integrity in Canada are not made by judges, but rather by administrative officials.
Lynda Collins and Lorne Sossin explain how environmental laws in Canada are predominately
exercised through statutory discretion which "arise[s] where the statute empowers officials to
make a judgment-whether to exercise a specific authority or not, and if so, in what ways and at
what times.”107 According to Sossin and Collins “the judgment calls these officials make […]
have cumulatively come to define the state of environmental protection in Canada."108
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Although strengthening environmental objectives in the Charter would improve what is
being considered by administrative decision makers, it would not address a potentially more
fundamental issue. In writing about the process of Indigenous consultation and consent, Deborah
Curran considers the effects of the considerable power vested in administrative bodies and
argues that, administrative exercises such as consultation can depoliticize the decision making
process “rather than addressing the underlying issues about who is making decisions and has
authority.”109 According to Curran “to repoliticize, therefore, is to break out of state-sanctioned
consultation processes to challenge the very basis of decision-making. It is to affirm the
complex, multiscalar and political nature of environmental governance.”110 Following this logic,
it becomes clear that the issue with the amount of statutory discretion present in Canadian
environmental law cannot simply be remedied by controlling what is considered, instead we
must critically consider who is making these decisions.
These pieces taken together cast doubt on whether courts and judges are capable of
leading social change, as judges’ ideology and concerns about institutional limitations will
colour how they decide any given case. Furthermore, as Sossin, Collins, and Curran argued,
judges may not even be responsible for making the most important decisions related to
environmental governance in Canada. In chapter five of this thesis I will measure the litigation
strategies employed by proponents of the right to a healthy environment against this scholarship
to determine whether judges and courts are capable of answering these calls for them to lead
social change.
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Summary
In this chapter I integrated scholarship from several subdisciplines of legal studies which
are relevant to determining the effect of litigating the right to a healthy environment. I began the
chapter by detailing relational approaches to law: Nedelsky’s theory of the relational self;111 as
well as approaches grounded in Anishinaabe law from Indigenous scholars McGregor, Mills, and
Borrows’ who call for collective reconciliation between the Crown, Indigenous Peoples and the
land.112 Each of these theories expand the legal imagination beyond the black letter law of the
settler state. These perspectives will be used in subsequent chapters to determine to what extent a
legal right to a healthy environment would be able to reflect the values of its proponents, as well
as to provide suggestions for potential interventions that could adequately reflect such values.
I then examined two key interventions that will determine the shape and efficacy of the
potential right to a healthy environment as detailed in scholarship: the effect of lawyers’
involvement and the effect of judicial interpretation.
First, I considered the impact of lawyer’s involvement within broader social movements.
Here I considered the role that lawyers play in reinforcing, or altering spatial norms;113
Blomley’s conception of the practice of bracketing;114 and Imai’s counter-pedagogy for social
justice.115 These perspectives are used in chapter four to analyze how lawyers’ input throughout
the litigation of the right will transform the goals and strategies of Canadian environmental
activists.
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Through examining legal histories of litigation campaigns targeted at effecting social
change I then examined Rosenberg’s Constrained Court theory,116 Siegel’s concern of reform
which does not eliminate power and status differentials enhancing “the legal system's capacity to
legitimate residual social inequalities among status-differentiated groups,”117 Lessard’s
exploration of differential success rates for Charter equality claims depending on whether
budgetary impacts would be minimal or serious,118 and Petter and Hutchinson’s Charter
critiques.119 The work of these scholars demonstrates that there are significant barriers to
Canadian courts being able to lead social change. Furthermore, through presenting Curran’s as
well as Collins and Sossin’s analyses of the role of administrative law in environmental decision
making I have identified procedural limitations that accompany these substantive concerns about
the role of litigation in effecting social change.120 In subsequent chapters I apply these theories
and frameworks to assess the potential efficacy of litigating the right to a healthy environment
and explore potential unintended consequences the litigation may have.

116

Rosenberg, supra note 1 at 420.
Siegel, “‘The Rule of Love’”, supra note 93.
118
Lessard, “‘Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights’”, supra note 99 at 318.
119
Petter, “Immaculate Deception”, supra note 37; Hutchinson, supra note 104.
120
Curran, “Indigenous Processes of Consent”, supra note 109 at 572; Collins & Sossin, supra note 107 at 294.
117

34

Chapter Three: Methodology
Documentary Analysis
My analysis begins with an examination of scholarly arguments in favour of the right to a
healthy environment. These works (such as Boyd’s body of work) are presented within this
thesis as data to build an understanding of what the proponents of the right to a healthy
environment are seeking. In this way my use of these sources is distinguishable from my use of
other secondary sources, such as those which detail the factors which will influence the
expression of the right to a healthy environment.
Following my examination of the argument for the litigation of the right to a healthy
environment within scholarship, the next step was to examine documents published by ENGOs
taking up the litigation. These sources provide important context for not only determining what
the rationale for choosing to litigate is, but for also determining how such litigation is being
advocated for to the public.
Lastly, primary court documents, specifically the statement of claim in La Rose121 and the
notice of Application in Mathur,122 were analyzed. These documents were critical for identifying
the legal arguments, and how they differ from the arguments previously made to the public while
seeking their support.
Interviews
While the above documentary analysis provides a rich understanding of the strategies
ENGOs have adopted while litigating the right to a healthy environment, it does not provide full
context regarding their decision making process. Although some ENGOs are adopting the

121
122

Supra note 23.
Supra note 25.

35

strategy to litigate the right to a healthy environment, it does not mean that they have full faith
that such litigation will successfully lead to social change. Rather, these organizations will likely
have contemplated some or all of the critiques of the litigation which I have to offer in this
thesis. In such a case these organizations may have nevertheless determined that despite these
flaws, litigation offers the best choice out of a series of similarly flawed options for action during
this climate emergency. In order to incorporate this type of nuance into my understanding and
arguments I interviewed senior members of Canadian ENGOs, including one individual whose
organization was involved in the litigation of the right to a healthy environment. The goal of
these interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of the process and strategic considerations
which go into ENGO decision making, with an emphasis on how such organizations make
decisions to either litigate, or abstain from litigating.
Three interviews with senior members of ENGOs were completed to assist this analysis.
Two of the participants were located in British Columbia. The third was located in Toronto. All
of the interviews were conducted by phone due to either due location constraints, or because of
concern for health and safety due to COVID-19.
The interviews were each forty-five minutes to an hour in length and the questions were
open ended in nature. My approach to formulating and asking these questions was informed by
American political scientist Jeffrey M. Berry’s approach to elite interviewing. Berry specifically
warns,“[I]nterviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be
objective and to tell us the truth. We have a purpose in requesting an interview but ignore the
reality that subjects have a purpose in the interview too: they have something they want to
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say.”123 According to Berry if “all we want to know is the subject’s point of view” then “this
problem doesn’t loom as large.”124 I thus limited my questioning to questions designed purely to
ascertain the participant’s point of view, their organization’s point of view, and their
organization’s decision making procedure. These questions included, but were not limited to:
“how does your organization evaluate the potential outcomes of prospective litigation?”; “does
your organization believe that the Charter is a promising site for intervention for environmental
protection?”; and “what is your organizations view on the possibility of adequately addressing
climate change through political/legislative action?” One further benefit of adopting this type of
interviewing approach was that I was able to purposely not ask any leading questions about the
participant’s organization’s attempts to work in partnership with Indigenous peoples and nations.
This approach was beneficial as if the subject’s organization was truly committed to forming
such partnerships, that commitment would become apparent in discussions of the organization’s
strategy even in the absence of explicit prompting.
Data Analysis and Limitations
Given the scope and timing of this project the interview data is quite limited and does not
provide a full and complete representation of the decision-making process within ENGOs. The
small sample size invalidates the ability to use this data to make any broad conclusions. Due to
this recognition the data obtained from the interviews is used throughout this thesis to
contextualize and add depth to my arguments and the arguments in favour of litigating the right
to a healthy environment, rather than forming the heart of the analysis.
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Chapter Four: The Lawyers’ Impact
In this chapter I analyze the impact of actions and strategic choices made by lawyers, and
their organizations, in the context of the litigation of the right to a healthy environment. I first
argue that the decision to litigate alone is significant as it implicitly affirms the authority of the
settler state over issues of environmental governance. I then examine the choices made by
ENGOs and their lawyers in formulating arguments to bring to these courts. I argue that in
making strategic choices aimed to maximize the chance of a successful disposition in litigating
the right to a healthy environment, lawyers bracket some values that proponents of the right wish
to advance as extralegal and thus place them outside the frame of the dispute. For example, the
desire to ensure ecological integrity for its own sake may be important to supporters of the right,
but is unlikely to be seen as cognizable by lawyers and courts. I further argue that in doing so
these lawyers will transform the dispute in ways that are not easily understood by the non-legally
trained public. This runs the risk of a narrow legal right to a healthy environment being mistaken
for widespread social reform that it is not likely to be.
The analysis of the arguments that the ENGOs litigating the right to a healthy
environment are making will be organized by applying the framework for analyzing the effect of
lawyers on altering spatial norms forwarded by Deborah G. Martin, Alexander W. Scherr, and
Christopher City in “Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the Production of Space.”125 As
mentioned previously Martin et al. identify four dimensions of lawyers’ activities which have the
capacity to alter these norms: translation, transformation, acting as agents, and exerting power.
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As the concepts of translation and transformation are mutually reinforcing, the analysis begins
with an investigation of these two effects.
Litigation as an Affirmation of Settler State Authority
The La Rose and Mathur cases each directly involve Indigenous plaintiffs who are being
supported by settler-founded ENGOs (through receiving funding and legal counsel from the
David Suzuki Foundation and Ecojustice respectively). As a result, and as detailed in the
literature review, the relationship between these organizations, the plaintiffs they are
representing or funding, and the state will be shaped by settler colonialism. The decision to bring
these claims to the settler state’s courts as a means to mediate these relationships has
consequences on its own.
If each case is intended to be brought in partnership with Indigenous peoples it will be
essential to centre and expressly address the impacts of settler colonialism on the relationship
involved. As Styres and Zinga argue:
It is highly unlikely that an Indigenous collaborator would be totally unaware of colonial
influences; however, it is possible that a non-Indigenous collaborator may be largely or
completely unaware of colonial influences. A non-Indigenous collaborator may be
entering into the collaboration with good intentions but without an understanding of what
the core principles really mean when they are enacted on a daily basis and without an
appreciation of the depth and insidiousness of colonial relations.126
According to Anishinaabe sociologist Damien Lee this lack of awareness can result in
“well meaning people” being “co-opted through state-controlled legislative frameworks to
undermine Indigenous nations in the name of state interest in resources.”127 Lee argues that
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ENGOs can be a vehicle for this type of co-opting as through “abiding state-affirming legislation
rooted in Eurocentric and colonial ideologies,” ENGOs “play a key role in ensuring federal and
provincial governments in Canada gain and maintain access to resources in Indigenous
territories.”128 According to Lee this issue is not easily remedied as “the very fabric of state
legislation within which ENGOs operate and take for granted is the primary problem.”129
Thus, although it is essential for settler ENGOs to ensure Indigenous representation and
to strive to work in partnership with Indigenous peoples, they must also be cognizant of the
effects of colonialism on their own structures and practices, and their potential role in
perpetuating systems of colonial oppression. Not only must Settler ENGOs avoid perpetuating
the harmful influences of settler colonialism, they must also actively commit to tackling these
influences in order to work in partnership with Indigenous peoples. Such an orientation would
not only be necessary for ethical reasons, but also to ensure the efficacy of efforts to promote
ecological integrity in Canada.
As detailed in the introduction McGregor, Whitaker, and Sritathan argue that “from an
Indigenous point of view, environmental injustices, including the climate crisis” are “inevitably
tied to, and symptomatic of, ongoing processes of colonialism, dispossession, capitalism,
imperialism/globalization and patriarchy.”130 This interconnectedness is echoed by Sámi
Indigenous studies scholar Rauna Kuokkanen who argues “violence directed at the land, such as
large-scale extractive industries and various forms of environmental destruction, is a central
element of relations of domination.”131 For Kuokkanen “Indigenous self-determination in its
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fullest sense—that is, containing the breadth of its individual and collective aspects and
potential— cannot materialize or be exercised without restructuring all relations of domination…
These relations are frequently interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and thus must be tackled
together.”132 Thus work to address climate change must also be work to address the ongoing
relations of settler colonialism.133 As Kuokkanen argues, the many intersecting oppressions that
Indigenous communities are faced with today have real consequences for these communities. A
prominent Canadian example of this can be seen in McGregor’s observation that “First Nations
face serious problems in relation to water quality” and “do not enjoy the same level of protection
as non-Aboriginal communities” with regards to water quality.134 McGregor argues that these
issues are not discrete but rather connected to “colonial history and ongoing institutionalized
racism” which makes “resolving First Nations water quality concerns even more complex.”135
Kuokkanen identifies a tendency within Indigenous self-determination scholarship to
“treat land and resource rights as oppositional to or unconnected from ‘social issues.’”136
However, if we are to engage in a process of collective reconciliation with the earth, we will
need to be prepared to address all relations of domination which effect ecological integrity. This
means ecological integrity must not be treated as a discrete issue. This is additionally essential
for any kind of co-management or partnership because as Styres and Zinga argue “the
Indigenous party is not responsible for dealing with the colonial baggage that has been left
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behind from historical colonial relations and research —that is the non-Indigenous party’s
responsibility.”137
In both the Mathur and La Rose cases legal counsel has sought to recognize the
consequences faced by Indigenous peoples as a result of the settler state’s contribution to climate
change. The Statement of claim filed in the La Rose case presents the factual basis for its section
15 claim by arguing that “climate change is harming Indigenous peoples and communities in
Canada” and that “Indigenous peoples are among the most vulnerable to climate change.”138
Similarly the notice of application in Mathur states that “if global warming exceeds 1.5°C above
pre-industrial temperatures, the impacts of climate change will include (…) an increase in harms
to Indigenous peoples, including increased impacts on health, access to essential supplies, ability
to carry out traditional activities, loss of livelihood and displacement.”139
What is important to note however, is that each of these arguments explicitly frame the
involvement of Indigenous peoples in the case in relation to the “harm” that they experience as a
result of the Canadian state’s actions. Unangax̂ Critical Race and Indigenous Studies scholar Eve
Tuck’s work highlights the consequence of this type of framing. Tuck calls on researchers to not
centre damage narratives when collaborating with Indigenous communities. Tuck identifies
“damage-centered research” as “research that operates, even benevolently, from a theory of
change that establishes harm or injury in order to achieve reparation.”140 Engaging in this type of
work is dangerous because “it is a pathologizing approach in which the oppression singularly
defines a community” as ‘broken’.141 Tuck proposes the use of “desire-based research
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frameworks” which are “concerned with understanding complexity, contradiction, and the selfdetermination of lived lives” as an alternative.142 Such a framework “is intent on depathologizing
the experiences of dispossessed and disenfranchised communities so that people are seen as more
than broken and conquered. This is to say that even when communities are broken and
conquered, they are so much more than that—so much more that this incomplete story is an act
of aggression.”143
Ermine’s conception of recognizing the “ethical space” between settlers and Indigenous
peoples provides another promising way to reorient this tendency to engage in damage-centered
approaches while fostering relationships with Indigenous communities, whether for the purpose
of research or otherwise. Ermine argues that:
The conditions that Indigenous peoples find themselves in are a reflection of the
governance and legal structures imposed by the dominant society. Indeed, what the
mirror can teach is that it is not really about the situation of Indigenous peoples in this
country, but it is about the character and honor of a nation to have created such
conditions of inequity. It is about the mindset of a human community of people refusing
to honor the rights of other human communities.144
Indigenous law scholar, and member of the Tanganekald, Meintangk and Boandik First
Nations, Irene Watson similarly wonders whether settlers are “able to comprehend their plight
when for centuries they have known us as the ‘Indigenous victim’ and they don’t know how to
begin to see the extent of their own losses?” Watson argues that colonialists “are losing the spirit
and connection to the natural world, but they have yet to acknowledge that they have lost
anything.”145
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Indigenous representation amongst the class of plaintiffs within the current right to a
healthy environment cases is important. Additionally, there is a range of reasons individual
Indigenous youth have joined these actions. However, as detailed in the introduction of this
thesis, it remains nonetheless important to critically consider how the claims may shape the
Canadian state’s response to climate change impacts on Indigenous communities. The current
litigation is not designed to confront the ongoing legacy of settler colonialism in partnership with
Indigenous peoples, or to recognize their jurisdiction to make decisions about their lands and
health.146 Rather, it is reinforces the role of the Canadian state – at best minimizing damage to
Indigenous peoples as it exercises its presumptive authority. The choice to litigate can then have
the unintended yet harmful effect of legitimating the settler state’s assumed authority to decide
not only how this damage will be addressed but also over environmental governance more
broadly. As a result, if successful, the potential right to a healthy environment will be
implemented through relationships which are fundamentally embedded in settler colonialism. In
effect the litigants are asking the court, a body representative of the settler colonial systems
responsible for the alleged harm, to unilaterally deliver a solution which can undo the harm. In
this way the decision to litigate carries with it profound implications which ought to be
considered when lawyers choose whether or not to engage in such litigation.
Translation and Transformation
Having detailed the consequences of the choice to litigate, I now turn to an analysis of the
impact of the formulation of legal arguments. Central to Martin et al.’s arguments about the role
that lawyers have in producing outcomes is their identification of the capacity for lawyers to
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engage in the related acts of translation and transformation.147 The authors identify translation
as occurring when lawyers take “data” gathered from their clients and other participants in a
legal dispute and shape this input to fit particular legal rules or processes, to be general enough to
fit legal contexts, or to speak to different audiences (i.e. a lawyer may outline the clients goals
different if in a negotiation as opposed to a trial).148 The related concept of transformation is
observed as the result of a lawyers’ translation and speaks to how lawyers transform the
meaning of conflicts through not only losing meaning while translating, but also by
“affirmatively” adding new meaning by either (1) shaping the conflict to fit the legal process
which has the effect of adding the meanings and norms inherent in the legal process; and/or (2)
introducing their own values to a conflict, intentionally or not, by “filtering information through
the lens of their own values, values grounded in the partialities of lawyers’ lives.”149
Martin et al.’s concept of translation additionally maps neatly to Nicholas Blomley’s
observation of the practice of “bracketing”. As described in the literature review Blomley states
that “law is particularly invested in producing clarity, legibility, and certainty through the
drawing of distinctions.” Due to its “institutionalization, law is a powerfully performative
site.”150 The bracketing of issues as “extralegal” (being not relevant to a legal dispute) or
“infralegal” (not important enough to be part of legal consideration) may seem to be a
“ubiquitous and seemingly inescapable dimension” of conflict.151 However, Blomley argues that
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this act is “violent and disruptive” to how a conflict is shaped and has the potential to create a
“political and ethical battle zone.”152
Nedelsky’s relational rights model is helpful in demonstrating why the actions lawyers
take in both removing ideas from a conflict through translation or bracketing, and also adding
ideas to a conflict through transformation can create this “political and ethical battle zone.” As
detailed in the literature review Nedelsky makes a distinction between values and rights. Values,
she argues, are abstract articulations of what a society sees as essential to humanity. Rights on
the other hand, according to Nedelsky, are “institutional and rhetorical means of expressing,
contesting, and implementing such values.”153 She argues that relationships bridge abstract
values and legal rights, and that the goal of rights is to foster relationships which advance our
values.154
If there is a gap between our values and our legal rights, then the process of arriving at
these legal rights could be this “political and ethical battle zone” that Blomley identifies. It is
here that lawyers engage in translating and transforming societal values to specific institutional
and legal rights, and where relationships are bracketed as either relevant or irrelevant.
The Values and Relationships Implicated with the Right to a Healthy Environment
It is useful then, in the context of examining Charter rights, to examine what the legal
relationships formed by these rights are. What do these relationships tell us about the values they
attempt to uphold? In the case of the proposed right to a healthy environment the relationship at
play is solely between the individual and the state. This is because an individual can only claim
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the protection of Charter rights against a government actor,155 a private entity carrying out
government action,156 or government inaction.157
Determining the values at play in the argument for the right to a healthy environment is
not quite as clear. However, it is possible to trace the values environmental organizations appeal
to garner support for the right to a healthy environment. In 2013 the David Suzuki Foundation
(who are now supporting the La Rose et al. vs. Her Majesty the Queen right to a healthy
environment challenge) published a report by David Boyd, now UN Special Rapporteur,
outlining the importance of achieving constitutional recognition of the right to a healthy
environment. This report is a particularly interesting entry point as it was published outside of
the context of active litigation. As a result, the report reflects the values sought to be advanced
by litigating right to a healthy environment before the translation and transformation inherent to
such challenges occurs. In the report Boyd identified “six main reasons why constitutional
recognition of the right to a healthy environment is imperative for Canada’s future” which
included:
1. reflecting the fact that environmental protection is a core, fundamental value of
Canadians;
2. strengthening Canada’s poor environmental performance and preserving this country’s
beautiful landscapes, natural wealth and biodiversity;
3. protecting Canadians’ health from environmental hazards such as air pollution,
contaminated food and water and toxic chemicals;
4. clarifying the responsibility of all governments to protect the environment;
5. acknowledging that environmental rights and responsibilities are core elements of
indigenous law; and
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6. keeping up with the evolution of international law.158
This list presents a host of different values and relationships which the right to a healthy
environment should be striving to respect.159 The relationships highlighted include the
relationship between: individual Canadians and the natural world (as highlighted in the first
reason); the state and the natural world (highlighted in the second and fourth reason); the state
and individual citizens (as highlighted in reason three); the settler state and Indigenous peoples
(reason five); and the Canadian state and global citizenry (reason six). The list also highlights
multiple values including: the recognition of the inherent value of nature (reason one and two);
the maintenance of human health and ability to thrive (reason three); and the need to fulfill
responsibilities (reasons four, five, and six).
The breadth of reasons offered by Boyd stands in contrast to what is argued when right to
a healthy environment cases are presented to courts. Take for example the notice of application
filed for Mathur et al. v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario which sets its primary
argument as being that “the Applicants are Ontario residents with genuine interests in preventing
catastrophic climate change that will pose pervasive and serious risks to health and wellbeing of
those in their generation and future generations of Ontarians” [emphasis added].160 Additionally,
in Ecojustice’s press release regarding the filing of the notice, three quotes were included from
the applicants with regard to the notice:
Sophia Mathur, 12-year-old applicant from Sudbury, said:
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My generation deserves a future. When I grow up, I want to be a lawyer. I also have lots
of other hopes and dreams and I want the chance to make them come true. That’s why it
was important for me to start striking for the climate in November 2018, and why I’m
working with other young people to take the government to court today.”
Shaelyn Wabegijig, 22-year-old applicant from Peterborough, said:
“Climate change is hurting Indigenous and coastal communities that rely on the land and
ocean for cultural and physical survival. I do not feel like I am secure or safe in my
future, which is why I am committed to fighting for climate action. I do not want to bring
children into a world that is dying, or where they’re at risk of illness or harm imposed by
climate change.”
Alex Neufeldt, 23-year-old applicant from Ottawa, said:
“Open for business is Doug Ford’s favourite catchphrase. But if he really cared about
protecting the economy for young entrepreneurs like me, he wouldn’t have rolled back
the province’s climate targets. We can help stop climate change and also create jobs. But
we need the political will to do it.161
What stands out from the above messaging is that the messages are focused entirely on the
impact that governmental inaction with regard to climate change will have on the health and
lives of the applicants and other young people. This stands in sharp contrast to Boyd’s rationale
for a right to a healthy environment which acknowledged multiple values and relationships
which such a right is intended to uphold.
It is possible that this focus is a strategic choice as well, as the notice further states that
the Applicants “have significant concerns over the risks that climate change poses to their health
and wellbeing, their futures, their lives, their communities as well as the environment” [emphasis
added].162 The operative change from the quote above is the change of the language from interest
to concern when environmental protection is invoked. This is in itself an act of bracketing. The
lawyers writing the notice are acknowledging that the Applicants right to life is a legal interest
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and thus legally relevant, whereas the Applicants concern about the environment is an extralegal
fact that does not rise to the level of an interest.
This distinction demonstrates that as the clients’ concerns are being translated into legal
categories, those values which are relevant to the legal right are the focus – here the concern for
their own health. Those deemed not to be relevant to the legal right (specifically concern for the
environment in this case) are briefly mentioned but no relief is sought to oblige the government
to address such concerns. It is worth noting here that it is possible that this disconnect is not due
to constraints of the law alone. An additional variable, as discussed later in this chapter, is that
these ENGOs have very specific case selections policies and may have formulated these legal
arguments before finding clients whose experience fits those arguments. Such a process could
theoretically lead to a lawyer-led litigation strategy that does not perfectly fit the clients
experience, however directly identifying such a trend is beyond the scope of this thesis.
This is further illustrated in the statement of claim filed by the applicants in the La Rose
et al., which is being supported in part by the David Suzuki Foundation, the same foundation
which published the Boyd report cited above. In this statement of claim the applicants detail the
“legal basis” for their claim. The “legal basis” outlined consists only of relief sought to address
damage done to the plaintiffs by climate change including: children and youth’s rights to life,
security of the person, and equality; and youth and future generations’ ability to access resources
“subject to a public trust.”163 The principled arguments about the need and desire to preserve
Canada’s “beautiful landscapes, natural wealth and biodiversity” because environmental
protection is a “core Canadian value” which were present in the David Suzuki Foundation’s
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original plea for support for the right to a healthy environment164 are now nowhere to be found
when the “legal basis” is defined.
It is here that we see how bracketing fundamentally changes what values and
relationships are at play. As Blomley argues “for a legal transaction to occur, a space must be
marked out within which a subject, object, and set of relations specified as legally consequential
are bracketed, and detached from entanglements (ethical, practical, ecological, ontological) that
are now placed outside the frame.”165 In the transactions detailed above the value of nature, the
emphasis on responsibility, as well as the relationships between the individual, the state, and
nature have been presented as “entanglements” which are not legally consequential and thus
have been “placed outside the frame.” As a result the conceptual focus on this broader set of
values and relationships is transformed into an exclusive focus on the anthropocentric elements
of the argument for the right to a healthy environment, namely the state’s responsibilities to its’
citizens and the value of preserving human life and equality.
The Loss of the Value for Nature
By framing the claim for a right to a healthy environment as only an anthropocentric
entitlement to health the legal action reproduces a central dichotomy at the heart of the Canadian
state’s legal system – the separation of humans from the natural world. Indeed, the failure of the
proposed legal right to recognize any intrinsic value of ecological systems, undermines many of
the other values and relationships originally set out by Boyd. This dichotomy is not unique to the
proposal for the right to a healthy environment. Rather, it is central to the Canadian state’s legal
system. As explored later in the concluding chapter, Indigenous and critical property law
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scholarship provide useful frameworks to understand the breadth of the problems created by this
framing.
Education scholars Sandra Styres (“an Indigenous researcher residing on Six Nations of
the Grand River Territory”)166 and Dawn Zinga (“a non-Indigenous researcher (…) who is a
several generations-removed immigrant” to Canada)167 discuss this issue by making a distinction
between ‘land’ as a general term and ‘Land’ as a proper name. To Styres and Zinga when one
refers to the general term of ‘land’ they are referring to “landscapes as a fixed geographical and
physical space that includes earth, rocks, and waterways.”168 Conversely ‘Land’ as a proper
name “extends beyond a material fixed space. Land is a spiritually infused place grounded in
interconnected and interdependent relationships, cultural positioning, and is highly
contextualized.”169 Styres and Zinga make this distinction because they recognize that for
Indigenous peoples ‘Land’ is the “central underpinning of all life and its relational nature has
been recognized and embraced across the ages.”170
This way of seeing ‘Land’ is very different from how the laws of the settler state
operates. Canadian environmental and property law scholar Estair Van Wagner argues that
“central to the ownership model of property, and its role in colonial expansion, is the
presumption of a dichotomy between nature and culture, whereby people (the owners) are
detached from places (the owned).”171 This legal ordering of land as property prevents us from
engaging with the responsibilities that flow from our being on the Land. Australian property and
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environmental law scholar Nicole Graham further explores this dichotomy by arguing that “real
property law is not about ‘things’, it is about ‘persons’, or more accurately, interpersonal
relations. The concept of property works by excluding or abstracting the physical specificity of
‘things’ so that they no longer matter and the legal analysis can focus on the relativity of
competing abstract rights.”172 Graham continues,
Modern property law is thus essentially an intellectual exercise in what has been referred
to as ‘dephysicalisation’. Dephysicalisation describes the gradual socio-legal process
whereby the environment, or more technically the abstract ‘thing’ (such as land), became
excluded from the property relation that had hitherto regulated legal relations between
persons and things, but which now regulated only legal relations between persons.
Consequently, land and natural resources are regarded by modern law, at least within the
‘fundamental’ and ‘basic’ category of private property law, as no more than an irrelevant
‘thing’... The abstraction or dephysicalisation of property into a discourse of rights
between persons with respect to a fungible ‘thing’, rather than between persons and
things, obscures the fact that the ‘thing’ is the actual and non-fungible condition of
human existence.173
In the case of the Charter, the relationship being mediated is between the state and its citizens.
As argued previously, this anthropocentric framing marks a departure from what the actual intent
for seeking a right to a healthy environment is, as it significantly narrows the relationships such a
right is intended to impact.
This then maps neatly on to the notion of dephysicalisation as detailed by Graham above.
The anthropocentric framing of the litigation of the right to a healthy environment results in the
real physical thing (the environment/nature in this case) being completely excluded from the
legal argument. The relationship at the core of a right to healthy environment, is now between
persons about the environment rather than a direct connection between the person and their place
within Earth’s systems. Furthermore, individual responsibility to maintain a healthy environment
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has been replaced with language of an abstract right that individuals would possess against other
persons, or in this case the state, to be entitled to a healthy environment. This is consequential.
Graham explains:
the problem here of course is that if the paradigm that underpins modern law is
anthropocentric, then law remains itself a major barrier to the adaptation of the modern
economy towards environmental sustainability. The system of law cannot maintain its
abstract categories of ‘dephysicalised’ rights and relations between persons and also be
effective in any responses it may develop to environmental problems of a necessarily
physical nature. ‘Sustainability requires that human social systems and property-rights
regimes are adequately related to the larger ecosystems in which they are embedded.’174
Graham concludes that there is a “need to align the rights of ownership with the responsibilities
of ownership.”175 Following this logic the right to a healthy environment must be aligned with
the responsibility to ensure healthy relations with the environment, which the proposed right to a
healthy environment does not do.
This need for alignment connects to Mill’s theory of rooted constitutionalism. Mills
argues that Canadian constitutionalism fails “to treat earth as an always already connected family
of beings with whom to stand in relationship. [Settlers] regard earth only as a set of resources to
be used (or preserved) instrumentally.”176 The consequence of the translation and transformation
of values into rights results in exactly this. As such, lawyers are (most likely unintentionally)
steering our values which could be rooted in the earth, or responsibility to the earth, and instead
translating them into dephysicalised legal rights “growing away from the earth.”
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The Effects of a Narrow Legal Right
The potential complications of translation and transformation do not end with upholding
the dephysicalised model of relations with Land. One interviewee when asked about climate
litigation expressed that “if we believe in a just transition and we believe in all those things, it
takes everybody to do it. I don’t think that there is just one route.” The interviewee continued on
to explain that:
right now our Charter rights- we can’t apply them to independent actors. So what can we
do about that? If there is a right to a healthy environment then the government can
legislate for that. But then at some point we need corporations to think that they will be
held accountable if they don’t comply with those things (…) Corporations are going to
always claim that they aren’t public actors so they can’t be held responsible in the same
way so how do we get at that when they are the ones who are causing the harm or they
are the ones perpetuating these things.177
The interviewee answered their rhetorical question by suggesting that perhaps it will be
necessary to engage in further litigation against carbon majors to fill this gap. 178 There are two
problems with this possibility. First, each interviewee identified limited organizational resources
as a serious consideration in pursuing environmental litigation. To address this concern some
ENGOs are engaging in advocacy work to convince governmental bodies to sue carbon majors
themselves. Greenpeace Canada’s briefing note to Toronto City Council’s Infrastructure and
Environment Committee is a prime example of this.179 In their note Greenpeace urges the city of
Toronto to explore taking carbon majors to court in order to recoup the costs the city will incur in
their efforts to ameliorate the impacts of climate change on their residents.180 Such investment
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into the litigation strategy by cities or other governmental bodies could be a major boon for the
climate change litigation in Canada. However, to this point no governmental body has taken a
leading role in this effort.
A second, and potentially more long-term problem, is the potential that a successfully
litigated right to a healthy environment would reduce public pressure for further environmental
protections. As noted in my literature review both Reva Siegel and Gerald Rosenberg have
identified that changes to the law, even when not sufficient to remedy ongoing issues, can stifle
social movements. This is illustrated in how Rosenberg argues that “vindication of constitutional
principles accompanied by small change may be mistaken for widespread significant social
reform, inducing reformers to relax their efforts.”181 This result, Siegel argues has the effect that
groups seeking changes to legal regimes which have undergone an incomplete transformation
will be indisputably worse off “in their capacity to achieve further, welfare-enhancing reform of
the status regime in which they were subordinated.”182
This possibility should be a serious concern for proponents of the right to a healthy
environment, especially when considered in conjunction with the effects of this process of
translation and transformation. The right to a healthy environment may find support among lay
people for a variety of reasons, as demonstrated by the above analysis of Boyd’s reasoning for
the David Suzuki Foundation.183 The reality, however, is that the ultimate legal right, once
translated and transformed from abstract values into a legal instrument, will not be designed to
protect the range of values that the environmental movement seeks to protect. It is thus essential
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to be open and honest about what this proposed right will do, and will not do, in order to ensure
that the values that are not addressed are still strived towards through means beyond the scope of
this litigation.
Lawyers as Agents and Exerting Power
The second half of Martin et al.’s framework for examining the impact that lawyers have
on spatial disputes includes examining how lawyers act as agents and how lawyers exert
power.184 The authors explain that when lawyers act as agents they introduce ‘role separation’
and transactional costs to a dispute. ‘Role separation’ may include the fact that lawyers have
different commitments, concerns, and spatialities than the client. Transactional costs include the
costs “associated with paying the lawyer and drawing an unfamiliar third party into the
problem.”185 Meanwhile, lawyers exert power through altering power dynamics with their very
presence, or through their conscious and strategic planned interventions towards a desired
outcome.186
These two concepts are intimately related in the context of the right to a healthy
environment litigation due to how significant monetary considerations are to pursuing the
strategy. This concern was discussed by one of the interviewees, who is a practicing lawyer.
They stated that litigation is not at the top of their organizations’ list of strategies to engage with
the “climate movement” because,
the importance is in the grassroots movement and the actual environmental movement.
The lawyer’s space is to supplement and support that, we shouldn’t be at the top of that. I
guess in our view it’s how can litigation support or advance a lot of these causes and how
can it fit into the bigger picture? Right now, we’re not actively involved in active
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litigation. That doesn’t mean that in the future we can’t be but that would be very
strategic, and it would be very significant because it’s a costly undertaking and it takes up
a lot of resources.187
Another interviewee described how their organization seeks to build “honest relationships of
solidarity” with communities where the organization is not using the community “for a particular
outcome.” This organization does proceed to litigation however, if the community “is concerned
about [a] number of environmental issues and litigation would help that.” The interviewee
further recognized that in the case selection phase the organization’s “board often has to make
hard choices based on [their] capacity” because they “receive way more applications than [they]
can deal with.”188
These challenges are not unique to the interviewee’s organization. As the first
interviewee outlined above, litigation aimed at setting precedents is “a very costly undertaking”
that takes up “a lot of resources.” As the organizations involved with this type of work are
typically non-profit organizations,189 an extra constraint of allocation of limited resources is
added to the list of considerations when Charter litigation is contemplated.
Most organizations attempt to meet this challenge by creating a structured case selection
policy. Take for example Ecojustice’s case selection policy which they created due to the reality
that “there is simply more work than [they] can take on.”190 The first question that Ecojustice
asks is whether the issue is “an environmental priority.” In answering this question Ecojustice
considers whether “it is or will become one of the most significant threats to the environment”;
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whether “it presents one of the greatest opportunities for significant environmental protection or
restoration”; and whether “it is a prerequisite to succeeding on other environmental or legal
priorities, and needs ecojustice’s legal expertise now.”191 The analysis then turns to whether the
issue is “a legal priority” considering whether “it is a root cause of why the law is not enabling
significant public protection or restoration of the environment” or whether “it presents an
opportunity for enabling the law to address threats to significant environmental protection or
restoration.” The analysis next turns to considering “how will this case help change the future?”
And finally, Ecojustice considers whether the case would “help advance the goals set out in
[their] 2017-2020 strategic plan” which includes key considerations of fostering healthy
communities, protecting nature, and addressing climate change.192
This case selection policy is highly contextualized and fits well into Martin et al.’s
paradigm. In weighing cases in this matter organizations are introducing themselves to conflicts
as third party agents. As can be seen above these agents exhibit role separation by not simply
offering to assist the client in reaching their goals, but rather by entering the dispute with a
different set of “concerns, commitments, and spatialities” than the client. This type of process
additionally allows lawyers to exert power through choosing a set of facts to litigate which match
their “strategic planned interventions towards a desired outcome.” One interviewee explained the
issue with this separation by explaining that the relationship between a community and lawyers
should be “a symbiotic relationship” in which everyone must:
make sure that lawyers don’t drive the process because, through our practice and our
training, we have a narrower scope and view of the world because when we think of law
we work within these walls and we work within rules and systems. But I think that when
we have issues of justice you have to think beyond that. I don’t necessarily have the
191
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scope and perspective to do that, whereas people who actually live this day to day in the
community do or people who have other perspectives can drive that.193
This type of model creates an additional unique circumstance when analyzing the lawyer as an
agent. In the context that Martin et al. are discussing, a community has discovered their own
legal claim and are seeking a third party lawyer to help bring the claim to court, which introduces
the cost of the community paying for that lawyer. The transactional cost in our scenario however
works differently as the legal organization becomes an intermediary between the community
which has the claim, and the community of donors who are paying for the transactional cost of
the claim. This introduces an additional layer of commitments, concerns, spatialities, and desired
outcomes which do not necessarily correspond to the community’s.
This creates a situation similar to what Cole observed when he wrote about
environmental justice in the United States in the 1990’s. At the time Cole observed that the “Big
10” environmental law groups in the United States “suck[ed] up much of the meager foundation
money available for environmental justice work.”194 Cole argues that because “the
disproportionate funding of legal groups” creates “greater stature, the legal groups are
increasingly able, through their work and contacts in the press, to describe and define
environmental justice.” To Cole this is particularly problematic because “in a very real way, the
legal groups are re-creating one of the roots of environmental injustice – the making of decisions
by people not affected by those decisions.”195
The litigation of the right to a healthy environment plays out in a similar way as
organizations which have their own commitments to their donor base (whom the plaintiffs in
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these cases may not have the resources to access), bring their own agency and power to a dispute
which changes the goals of a dispute from being solely about their clients’ experience, to also
having the input and strategic choices of the monied organizations. This results in these
organization’s goals and strategies shaping the development of environmental law in much the
same way as Cole observed with the “big 10” in the states.
This approach also stands in stark contrast to Shin Imai’s “counter pedagogy for social
justice” which as described in the literature review outlines a set of skills necessary to counter
how legal education teaches lawyers to “structure reality” in a standardized way which is not
responsive to the needs and goals of communities that lawyers serve.196 In order to avoid this
structuring, which is functionally similar to the effects of lawyers that Martin et al. observe, Imai
suggests that lawyers need to develop the skills of collaborating with a community, recognizing
individuality, and taking a community perspective.197
Litigating the right to a healthy environment thus results in cases being chosen based on
how they match with the agency and commitments of environmental organizations, and then are
translated and transformed (or “re-constructed” as Imai would describe it)198 from the realities
experienced by the plaintiffs to cognizable legal categories for a judicial audience. This process
is unfortunately far more consistent with the top-down impacts of lawyers which Martin et al.
identify, than the counter pedagogy which Imai proposes. Furthermore, it would be challenging
to avoid formulating climate change litigation in this manner, because climate change is not
bound to any discrete place or felt by any single community alone. This reality makes it quite

Imai, “A Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice”, supra note 73 at 218.
Ibid at 201.
198
Ibid at 225.
196
197

61

difficult for an individual or community to bring such an all-encompassing claim which would
carry burdensome costs. As such it may be necessary for ENGOs to develop cases in this manner
in order to ensure that these critical issues are heard by Canadian courts.
However, even if the case selection process employed by ENGOs is necessary given the
contours of climate change and the Canadian legal system, the process will still have inherent
limitations. The chief limitation in the context litigation of the current right to a healthy
environment, is that the lawyer-led nature of these cases will likely carry the dephysicalising and
colonial properties of the settler legal system, while not accessing Imai’s pedagogy’s community
empowering benefits.
A Narrowed Vision: Conclusion on the Influence of Lawyers
In this chapter I have argued that through litigating the right to a healthy environment
lawyers fundamentally alter the claims borne from their clients’ experience in a matter which fits
the lawyers’ own priorities, experiences and spatialities. In applying Martin et al.’s framework I
have argued that the current approach to litigating the right to a healthy environment translates
and transforms concerns about a wide array of commonly held values, and valued relationships,
into a narrow legal construct which excludes much of these values and relationships. Further, I
have shown lawyers input their agency and exert power over the conflict through the process of
case selection. These influences together have the consequence of co-opting a movement that at
its core is about the public’s desire to protect the environment, and reforming the ideas into a
dephysicalised and colonial framework of relations with the earth that fits the demands of the
settler legal system. This further has the consequence of implicitly reinforcing settler states
claimed authority over environmental governance. Crucially, the fact that many of the values and
concerns of proponents of the right to a healthy environment have been effectively “left out of
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the frame” is not immediately cognizable, especially to the lay person. This could have the dire
unintended consequence of leading the non-legally trained public to believe the right to a healthy
environment will protect values that it simply is not designed to protect. This could induce these
individuals to relax their efforts to force social change to recognize the inherent value of Land,
thus weakening larger efforts to ensure ecological integrity in Canada.
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Chapter Five: The Effect of Judicial Interpretation
In this chapter I explore the effect of having the Canadian courts rule on, and potentially
implement, the right to a healthy environment. I argue that the outcomes sought in the current
right to a healthy environment cases are either unlikely to be won in litigation, or unlikely to be
as effective as hoped if secured and implemented. I argue that a primary problem is that the
litigation strategy is framed around the need to fight climate change specifically, and includes
telling the public that litigating the right to a healthy environment is an important part of the fight
to halt climate change. As climate change is an issue which requires “rapid, far-reaching, and
unprecedented changes in all aspects of society,”199 I argue that judges will not be willing or able
to lead this type of social change. As a result, this messaging allows for the possibility that courts
will recognize the right to a healthy environment, but a very narrowly defined right which does
not represent the values its proponents seek to advance and may be “mistaken for widespread
social reform.” 200 Pushing rights litigation as a strategy could have dire unintended
consequences, namely sapping the urgency of political efforts to mobilize the public to fight
climate change.
In coming to this conclusion, I distinguish between litigation goals which would hope for
proactive remedies (i.e. the court would direct Canadian legislatures to take action to prevent
climate change) or reactive remedies (i.e. a remedy in which the court prohibits the government
from taking action that will actively accelerate climate change) from the court. Following this
analysis, I then explore the argument made by some proponents of litigating the right to a healthy
environment that a “loss at trial could still provide a political victory for climate change
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activists—by framing climate change as a threat to rights and by requiring the government to
justify its ongoing failure to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions.”201
Proactive Remedies
A central thrust of the argument in favour of litigating the right to a healthy environment,
is that successful litigation will result in remedies being granted by the court to force the
government to take active steps to promote ecological integrity, including preventing climate
change. However, this outcome relies on there being a realistic chance that such a remedy would
be granted by the Canadian courts. As detailed in the literature review, Rosenberg has argued
that courts can only be “effective producers of social reform” where there is: (1) the presence of
“ample legal precedent for change”; (2) support for change from the legislative and executive
branches; and (3) some support, or low opposition, from citizens, and the court has the power to
implement change.202 In this subsection I will apply Rosenberg’s “Constrained Court” model to
the objectives of this kind of litigation to illustrate how unlikely these remedies are to be granted
in the Canadian context.
Precedent
The first constraint that Rosenberg identifies is the need for ample legal precedent for
change and support for such change within the broader legal culture. All of the current right to a
healthy environment cases seek to require that the government take action to meet the sciencebased emissions targets of the Paris Agreement. The pending Wet’suwet’en case argues “Canada
has a constitutional duty to protect its citizens from climate catastrophe, and draws a line against
reckless fossil fuel developments that will push us past the tipping point”. It “specifically names
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Coastal Gas Link and Pacific Trails fracked gas pipelines along with LNG export facilities in
Kitimat as particularly high-emitting fossil fuel projects that are likely to breach Canada’s
(already inadequate) emissions targets.”203 In La Rose the plaintiffs are seeking an order that the
Federal government “be required to develop and implement an enforceable plan that is consistent
with Canada’s fair share of the global carbon budget necessary to achieve GHG emissions
reductions consistent with the protection of public trust resources subject to federal jurisdiction
and the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”204 Meanwhile the Mathur case requests “an order
directing Ontario to revise its climate change plan under s. 4(1) of the CTCA once it has set a
science-based GHG reduction target.”205
Importantly, as the IPCC has determined, meeting these science-based emissions targets
would require “rapid, far-reaching, and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.”206 Thus,
in each of these cases the plaintiffs are requesting the court to make an order which will force a
legislative or executive body to fundamentally change their economic and climate change plans.
For example the Plaintiffs in La Rose argue that the Federal government contributes to climate
change through promoting “fossil fuel transport, export and import by approving and regulating
interprovincial and international fossil fuel infrastructure, including oil and gas transportation
pipelines” as well as through “continuing to incentivise fossil fuel exploration, extraction,
production and consumption through subsidies to the fossil fuel industry.”207 As the plaintiffs in
La Rose recognize, a right to a healthy environment could not successfully address the
contribution that the federal government makes towards climate change without compelling the
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redistribution of these resources. Thus, the change sought can be described as redistributive in
nature. Additionally, although those litigating the right to a healthy environment may view the
litigation as merely a tool in the overall movement to address Canada’s contributions to climate
change, the requests outlined above would go beyond this in practice. Asking judges to make
these types of orders that would require sweeping redistribution, would in effect be requiring
judges to lead social change in reshaping Canada’s climate change effort. Thus, even though the
proponents of the right to a healthy environment may not be seeking to have judges take such a
prominent role, they are in effect doing so by asking judges to take such action.
According to Rosenberg’s model, in order for this redistributive litigation to succeed the
court will need to be able to rely on doctrinal precedents for such redistribution, and supportive
movements within the broader legal culture.208 The distinction between citizens and “the broader
legal culture” within Rosenberg’s model is crucial for this application. One of the strengths of
the proposed right to a healthy environment is that it could see support from a large majority of
Canadian citizens. As Boyd argues:
According to public opinion polls, nine out of ten Canadians worry about the impacts of
environmental degradation on their health and the health of their children and
grandchildren. Nine out of ten are concerned or seriously concerned about climate
change, the loss of biodiversity, and pollution. Nine out of ten believe that sustainability
should be a national priority, and eight out of ten agree that we need stricter laws and
regulations to protect the environment. Among the fifty-seven nations for whom recent
data are available from the World Values Survey, Canadians rank behind only the
citizens of Andorra, Norway, Argentina, and Swtizerland in terms of favouring
environmental protection over economic growth and job creation.209
Although the support from the Canadian population may be present, judges are not
necessarily representative of the broad range of Canada’s population. As detailed in the literature
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review there are many critics of the Charter who argue that judges are not willing or able to
prompt the redistribution of wealth and power in Canada. A clear basis for such claims, as
illustrated in the literature review, is that the judges tasked with interpreting the Charter are
members of a community of legal elites, who through their training and experience have
developed a shared assumption that property rights “flow from a natural system of ordering.”210
Given this reality, these critics argue that over time Charter interpretation will trend towards
protecting property rights as this is consistent with the interests and ideology of judges and the
community of legal elites, rather than being representative of the interests of the public.211 212
These concerns have been borne out in reality, as the precedents set thus far by the SCC
suggest that judges have been unwilling to engage in significantly redistributive action at the
expense of property rights. As detailed in the literature review this reality is suggested by
Lessard’s research in which she found that no section 15 challenge with a ‘serious’ budgetary
impact had been successfully litigated at the SCC, leading her to conclude that “a minimal
budgetary impact is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful social benefit
challenge under section 15, while a serious budgetary impact poses a serious, if not impossible,
hurdle.”213 Lessard further found that the reasons given for rejecting the claims with a “serious”
budgetary impact were typically focused on concerns of “institutional limitations” in which the
judges believed they had a “lack of institutional competence to make complex budgetary
decisions,” and that “decisions with a significant budgetary impact lie outside the appropriate
constitutional role of the judicial branch in relation to the legislative branch.”214
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The Charter critiques combined with Lessard’s data demonstrate that the broader legal
culture, as well as the precedent set by Canadian courts, will constrain the current courts from
being willing to provide the type of ultimately redistributive relief sought by litigation of the
right to a healthy environment.215
Governmental Support and Implementation Powers
Rosenberg’s second and third constraints, namely the need for support from the
legislative and executive branches, and the court’s lack of implementation powers, are uniquely
connected when applied to litigating the right to a healthy environment under the Canadian
Charter. This connectedness begins with the reality that the Charter applies only to state actors
(any body that is not substantively autonomous from the executive branch of the government),216
or entities undertaking state action (i.e. implementing specific government policies and
programs).217 Furthermore, a common thread between the three current right to a healthy
environment cases is the plaintiff’s requests to have the court force Canadian governments to
rectify their “failure to do [their] fair share to avert a climate catastrophe.”218 Both the
Wet’suwet’en219 and La Rose220 cases target the federal government’s inadequate actions. As
detailed above, the La Rose case specifically claims “an order requiring the defendants to
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develop and implement an enforceable climate recovery plan that is consistent with Canada’s fair
share of the global carbon budget plan.”221 The Mathur case alternatively focuses on the
provincial level and seeks an order that Ontario’s government “forthwith set a science-based
GHG emissions target under s. 3(1) of the CTCA that is consistent with Ontario’s share of the
minimum level of GHG reductions necessary to limit global warming to below 1.5C above preindustrial temperatures or, in the alternative, well below 2C (i.e. the upper range of the Paris
Agreement temperature standard.”222
The orders sought in these cases reflect that even if the litigation is successful, Canadian
courts lack the power to directly protect citizens’ right to a healthy environment. As stated above
the right can only apply to actions of the government. As such whether the proposed right can
successfully enhance ecological integrity in Canada is directly reliant on whether federal and/or
provincial legislative bodies are supportive of the principles and values advanced by the right.
This would be particularly problematic for the specific goal that the current cases are seeking to
achieve: the creation of a new legal means to strengthen Canada’s response to climate change.
There are three main reasons why this reliance will be problematic. First, delaying tactics
used by an uncooperative legislative or executive body can nullify the right to a healthy
environment, as any such right needs to bring “rapid, far-reaching, and unprecedented change”223
in order to be effective and meaningful. The potential for irreparable harm to be caused by
governmental delay is well illustrated by the SCC’s decision in Doucet Boudreau v Nova scotia
(Minister of Education). In that case the SCC determined that courts in some circumstances may
need to supervise the progress of legislatures in implementing an order of the court in a timely
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manner in order to ensure “that courts issue effective, responsive remedies that guarantee full
and meaningful protection of Charter rights and freedoms.”224 The potential necessity of court
supervision is illustrative of the extent to which courts relies on legislative bodies to implement
the changes that they see fit. Furthermore, as time to respond to the challenges that climate
change poses is limited, such a supervisory order may be necessary in the current right to a
healthy environment cases. This reality poses yet another barrier to the potential for a successful
result from the current litigation, as a denial of a supervisory order could result in an
uncooperative legislature preventing the meaningful protection of the right to a healthy
environment.
Secondly, the institutional competency concerns that Lessard identified could lead the
court to determine that they do not have the ability to provide specific proactive remedies to
address climate change. As illustrated by the identification of the ways in which the government
contributes to climate change by the plaintiffs in the La Rose case, there is not a discrete answer
available for how to properly prevent climate change, as its’ causes and thus potential solutions
are diffuse.225 A court which believes that it has a “lack of institutional competence to make
complex budgetary decisions,” will be unwilling and thus unable to direct legislative bodies on
how to specifically address climate change, and thus it will likely be left to the elected
legislatures to choose how to protect the right to a healthy environment.226
Lastly, even in the event that the court decides to recognize the right to a healthy
environment, gives specific orders for how the legislature should protect the right, and chooses to
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supervise the implementation of those orders, a legislative body which does not wish to make
these monumental changes will not have to. This is because the legislature may use section 33 of
the Charter to pass legislation which would infringe a potential right to a healthy environment.227
Ultimately then, the utility of the right to a healthy environment as a tool to combat climate
change, will be determined by Canada’s legislative bodies.
If the court relies on legislative and executive bodies to craft laws and make decisions
which enhance Canada’s efforts to maintain ecological integrity, then the court cannot be leading
change as it will be relying on these bodies to be progressive enough to protect Charter rights In
this sense the courts will at best “second the social reform acts of other branches of
government.”228 This in turn highlights a fundamental problem with turning to courts to create
this type of social reform as such an idea “credits courts and judicial decisions with a power that
they do not have.”229
The Possibility of Proactive Remedies
In sum, Rosenberg’s theory, when applied to the Canadian context through the lens of the
Charter critiques and Lessard’s data, suggests that the nature of the Charter, and Charter
litigation, is not compatible with allowing courts to lead social change on climate change.
Furthermore, even if the court were to decide one of these right to a healthy environment cases in
a manner that contradicts most precedents, it still would rely on the legislative and executive
branches being willing to implement changes. Therefore, it is not likely that the litigation of the
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right to a healthy environment will result in a victory which provides proactive remedies toward
addressing climate change or other issues effecting ecological integrity.
Reactive Remedies
Given the urgency of addressing climate change, the desire to have the courts provide
proactive remedies is at the heart of the current claims. However, the right to a healthy
environment in its ideal form would address all issues which effect ecological integrity, not just
climate change. Thus, although proactive measures are necessary to address climate change,230
litigating the right to a healthy environment could also prompt courts to provide reactive
remedies to ensure overall ecological integrity.
Judicial Review and Deference
One reactive remedy that is being sought in the right to a healthy environment cases can
be found within the forthcoming Wet’suwet’en case which is being brought in part as a reaction
to “high emitting fossil fuel projects” such as the “Coastal Gas Link and Pacific Trails fracked
gas pipelines.”231 The Wet’suwet’en case is in part aimed at creating another required
consideration for administrative bodies and, as a result, another ground on which to ask the
courts to judicially review the decisions of administrative bodies and the cabinet. One
interviewee discussed the potential of the right as a “a huge breath of fresh air because now it
opens another legal avenue that wasn’t there before” within larger legal campaigns that “have
exhausted all other avenues to challenge government decisions.232 This is critical because the
bulk of decisions which impact ecological integrity are made by officials of the administrative
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state, and their decisions “have cumulatively come to define the state of environmental
protection in Canada."233
Concerningly however, the manner in which these decisions have defined environmental
protection in Canada may not be favourable to a robust application of the proposed right to a
healthy environment. This is the result of the great amount of discretion afforded to
administrative decision makers. Take for example the Impact Assessment Act234 from which the
decision that the Wet’suwet’en case will be challenging was made. According to Canadian
environmental studies scholar A. John Sinclair and Canadian environmental law scholar
Meinhard Doelle, the Act “lacks appropriate detail in relation to many key [impact assessment]
decisions and leaves these decisions for the most part to the discretion of Cabinet, the Minister
and the Impact Assessment Agency.”235 Sinclair and Doelle argue that this is a “central issue”
with the reformed act because “many of the key decisions to be made under the Act such as
public participation, scope, process options, and the public interest determination are left largely
discretionary.”236
The consequence of this type of discretion is well illustrated by Canadian environmental
law scholar Andrew Green’s article “An Enormous Systemic Problem” in which he completed
an analysis of how “the courts have used their powers of review both in general and in the
environmental area” by sampling the decisions of the federal court in such cases during 2005 and
2013.237 Green found that:

233

Collins & Sossin, supra note 107 at 294.
Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 1.
235
Meinhard Doelle & A John Sinclair, “The new IAA in Canada: From revolutionary thoughts to reality” (2019) 79
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 106292.
236
Ibid at 167.
237
Andrew Green, “‘An Enormous Systemic Problem’? Delegation, Responsibility and Federal Environmental
Law” (2016) 28:2 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice; Toronto 155–197 at 167.
234

74

environmental law is based heavily on discretionary powers and in general decisions by
the executive in the environmental area are likely to be reviewed on a reasonableness
basis, whether they are challenged on questions of law or discretion.238
This trend is important as “the courts tended to affirm decisions at a higher rate when using the
reasonableness standard of review,”239 and can explain why:
overall (…) if we look at the role played by courts in actual judicial reviews, the courts
have tended to not look like a tight monitor of government decisions, particularly given
the characteristics of environmental decisions. If you look specifically at environmental
as opposed to other regulatory decisions, the courts appear to take an even lighter hand.
They affirmed environmental decisions at a higher rate than other decisions overall, and
found for the government at an above average rate compared to other areas.240
Logically, this trend would likely apply to decisions regarding Charter rights as well. The SCC
has established that “administrative tribunals which have jurisdiction — whether explicit or
implied — to decide questions of law arising under a legislative provision are presumed to have
concomitant jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of that provision”241 and that “the
fact that Charter interests are implicated does not argue for a different standard.”242 Thus the
judicial review of administrative tribunals’ decisions regarding the right to a healthy environment
will likely be afforded the same level of deference as their interpretation of any other
environmental law.
It is true that a potential right to a healthy environment would create another required
consideration for administrative bodies dealing with environmental issues. However, given the
discretionary nature of these decisions, coupled with the deferential nature of the court towards
administrative bodies, it is unlikely that the right to a healthy environment would robustly protect

238

Ibid at 195.
Ibid.
240
Ibid at 196.
241
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 2003 SCC 54 at para 3.
242
Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 at para 45.
239

75

Canadian citizens from administrative decisions which would negatively effect ecological
integrity.
As discussed in the literature review, delegation to administrative bodies does not affirm
“the complex, multiscalar and political nature of environmental governance” as the act of doing
so “can channel and dissipate dissent, thus depoliticizing these processes and rendering them
administrative exercises rather than addressing the underlying issues about who is making
decisions.”243 Herein lies the problem with litigating the right to a healthy environment as a
strategy to address these decisions which “have cumulatively come to define the state of
environmental protection in Canada."244 The current litigation fails to challenge the authority of
administrative bodies to make these decisions. In doing so it attempts to remedy a problem
without addressing its core cause. Thus, the courts once again will not likely be able to lead
social change by awarding such a remedy.
Constitutional Backstop
Another reactive remedy that could be granted on the basis of protecting the proposed
right to a healthy environment can also be found in the desire to use it as a “constitutional
backstop” by challenging laws which erode environmental protections put in place by previous
government.245 This is a goal of the Mathur case which seeks a declaration that:
“ss. 3(1) and/or 16 of the CTCA, which repealed the Climate Change Mitigation and
Low-carbon economy Act, 2016, S.O. 2016, c. 7 and allowed for the imposition of more
lenient targets without mandating that they be set with regard to the Paris Agreement
temperature standard or any kind of science-based process, violates sections 7 and 15 of
the Charter in a manner that cannot be saved under s. 1, and is therefore of no force and
effect.”246
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This relief would be substantially different from the proactive remedies also sought in the same
case and detailed above. This is because the court could deem the impugned act to be
unconstitutional which would restore the previous emissions targets, creating real change to
Ontario’s climate target without having to rely on the government to change it themselves.
However, this is not requesting a court to lead social change with regards to environmental
protection, but merely asking the court to prevent new governments from repealing
environmental protections unless replacing them with more stringent requirements. For instance,
in Mathur the plaintiffs request that the court order Ontario to set a new emissions target after
finding the current target unconstitutional.247 This request reflects that the courts power to
enhance ecological integrity by preventing the reversal of environmental laws is quite limited. In
this case, although a finding that the repealing of the previous target was unconstitutional would
improve Ontario’s response to climate change, the response will still be inadequate without
further proactive measures.
There is merit to litigating for the recognition of a right to a healthy environment for this
reactive remedy. In fact, the recognition of a limited right to a healthy environment which
provides such remedies can create crucial legal precedent, which may allow the court to expand
the scope of the right in the future. The problem here however is that the current cases are
framed around the need to address climate change. As discussed above, climate change being a
time sensitive issue limits the efficacy of these types of long-term efforts. Due to the litigation of
the right being framed as a means to prevent climate change, it will be necessary that such a
reactive remedy is not the only immediate victory won. If this were to be the only remedy
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awarded the public may mistakenly believe that these incremental changes represent the
widespread social reform that the litigants are asking for.
Limiting Effect of the Awarding of Reactive Remedies
The potential for these reactive remedies to be “mistaken for widespread social reform”
becomes clearer when examining a final argument in favour of the utility of litigating the right to
a healthy environment: namely that a “loss at trial could still provide a political victory for
climate change activists—by framing climate change as a threat to rights and by requiring the
government to justify its ongoing failure to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions.”248
The Canadian public cares deeply about environmental protection. Thus, it may be true
that a declaration that Canadians do not have a right to a healthy environment would be met with
public backlash which could mobilize public demand for climate action. However at the same
time as discussed above and illustrated in Lessard’s work, Canadian judges are motivated to act
in manner which protects the courts’ institutional legitimacy.249 As a result, it is likely that
judges would avoid making a declaration that the right does not exist. This is because such a
declaration would likely lead the public to question whether the courts adequately protect their
rights and thus would question the courts role.
There is little reason to believe that Canadian courts would be willing to compel
governments to take specific proactive measures to maintain ecological integrity on the basis of a
newly recognized a right to a healthy environment. However, a court could recognize a right to a
healthy environment but then provide only the reactive remedies.
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Recognizing a negative right to a healthy environment may make a positive contribution
to the legal tools for maintaining ecological integrity. However, this small gain would likely
come at a great cost. As Siegel argues “we can see that civil rights reform may alleviate certain
dignitary or material aspects of the inequalities that subordinated groups suffer; but we can also
see that civil rights reform may enhance the legal system's capacity to legitimate residual social
inequalities among status-differentiated groups.”250 This would occur in this case in part because
the current litigation of the right to a healthy environment has been framed as a means to combat
climate change. If the right were to be recognized in this limited form, this “vindication of
constitutional principles accompanied by small change may be mistaken for widespread
significant social reform.”251 This could induce those who were the most committed to making
change to address climate change to relax their efforts because they may no longer see an
emergency where one still exists. In this way the recognition of a limited right to a healthy
environment could leave climate reformers indisputably worse off “in their capacity to achieve
further welfare-enhancing reform” of the regime which allows for Canada’s wholly inadequate
response to climate change and other issues of ecological integrity.252
The public messaging about litigation efforts contributes to the possibility that any
recognition might be “mistaken for widespread significant social reform.” For example, the
FAQ’s about the Mathur case published on Ecojustice’s website include: “a case like this is
likely going to be an uphill battle, but with Premier Ford doing less on the climate at precisely
the time he needs to be doing more, our clients have no choice but to turn to the courts to defend
their futures.” Additionally, Ecojustice’s website’s donation page tells potential donors that their
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“support fuels high-impact lawsuits and law reform to tackle the most urgent environmental
challenges we face” including cases related to the “climate emergency” (the Mathur case has
been billed by Ecojustice as their “biggest climate law suit yet”)253 which fights “to rapidly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and accelerate the shift to clean energy sources.”254 Claims that
litigation of the right to a healthy environment is a key tool in combatting climate change may
create an inaccurate picture of what such litigation can achieve, and what the alternatives are. For
example, with the messaging that there was “no choice” other than litigation available to
Ecojustice’s clients in the Mathur case, a supporter of that case may believe that any success, no
matter how qualified or limited, is the best possible outcome and not see the need, or possibility,
for further action. This is particularly problematic because as Rosenberg argues “strategic
choices have costs (…) not only does litigation steer activists to an institution that is constrained
from helping them, but also it siphons off crucial resources and talent, and runs the risk of
weakening political efforts.”255
Limited Recognition: Conclusion on the Impact of Judicial Interpretation
In this chapter I examined arguments in favour of litigating the right to a healthy
environment and their application within the current cases being brought before courts. I have
argued the current cases litigating the right to a healthy environment seek both proactive and
reactive remedies.
I argued that the proactive remedies sought by the litigation of the right to a healthy
environment would require the courts to lead social reform to combat climate change by
compelling legislative and executive bodies to pass laws which are redistributive in nature. In
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examining the feasibility of using the courts to achieve such change I applied the goals to
Rosenberg’s “Constrained Court” model. In applying this model I argued that the proponents of
litigating the right to a healthy environment are crediting “courts and judicial decisions with a
power that they do not have.”256 In fact courts are both unlikely to rule in a way that would
provide robust protection and would have difficulty ruling in ways that would provide robust
protections. These predictions are supported by a review of the history of rights-based broad
redistribution claims, by critical legal studies claims about judges-as-property-owning-wealthy
elites who are unlikely to be motivated to support broadly redistributive forms of change, from
the structure of the Charter itself, and the court’s lack of implementation powers. These factors
all demonstrate that it will be unlikely that the court will be able to play a leading role in the
promotion of social reform to promote ecological integrity, a role that would be necessary for the
court to assume in granting the remedies sought by the litigants in the current right to a healthy
environment cases.
Although the courts will not be likely to lead social reform, this does not mean that a
potential right to a healthy environment is without merit. Rather, the right could provide
particularly useful reactive remedies against laws and administrative decisions which would
harm ecological integrity. This usefulness is qualified however, as the current deferential trend in
judicial review of environmental administrative action limits the usefulness of the right as a
check on environmentally harmful decisions of the executive, and does not challenge their
authority to make these decisions. Additionally, although the right may be useful to prevent
newly elected governments from overturning laws which promote ecological integrity put in

256

Ibid.

81

place by previous governments, this role cannot be described as “leading” as it definitionally
only follows the actions of previous legislatures.
Finally, I argued that due to institutional legitimacy concerns judges will refrain from
definitively proclaiming that people do not have a right to a healthy environment. I suggested
that alternatively, the court may recognize a narrow right to a healthy environment which
ultimately will only be able to provide reactive remedies, thus preserving the status quo in terms
of environmental governance in Canada. In this way the interests and concerns of the court may
animate the eventual expression of the right to a healthy environment to be less reflective of the
values that its proponents seek to advance and more responsive to the demands of the Canadian
legal system.
In this case ENGOs seeking support from the public by arguing that the right to a healthy
environment would be an effective means to lead social change to combat climate change may
be siphoning off resources (including time, money, mental energy, commitment, and talent) that
could be put towards more direct interventions aimed at addressing this monumental and time
sensitive issue. The strategy and messaging also risks a victory in court being widely “mistaken
for widespread social reform,” which could have the unintended but not unpredictable
consequence of weakening political efforts to mobilize the public to take action against climate
change.257
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
Moving Towards Climate Justice
In the previous two chapters I detailed the effect of asking lawyers and judges to lead
social change in tackling climate change through the current litigation of the right to a healthy
environment. In those chapters I argued that in presenting the courts with arguments in favour of
adopting the right to a healthy environment lawyers are narrowing the scope of the values that
are protected by such a right by deeming some values to be infralegal (i.e. the desire to protect
human health) and others extralegal (i.e. “respecting that environmental protection is a core
fundamental value”258 of Canadian society). I then argued that judges have a belief about the role
of courts, and the judiciary as an institution itself has limitations, which makes it unlikely that
judges will lead social change. Finally, I argued that although judges are unlikely to lead social
change, their concern for the institutional legitimacy of the courts could lead them to recognize a
right to a healthy environment. However, they are likely to interpret such a right narrowly,
foreclosing the potential for proactive remedies to combat climate change. This narrow
interpretation would compound the narrowed scope of the right presented to the court by
lawyers. Therefore, any potential legal right to a healthy environment recognized by Canadian
courts is unlikely to be representative of the values that its proponents originally sought to
advance.
Following from the logic that a potential right to a healthy environment will be narrowly
defined and not reflective of the values which would adequately promote ecological integrity. I
will use the start of this concluding chapter to discuss potential alternative pathways for action
on climate change, and addressing the current ecological crisis more generally, through
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confronting settler colonialism. Below I argue that settler advocates can simultaneously address
the settler colonial foundations of the Canadian state’s relationship with the Land, and CrownIndigenous relations, by centring our relationship with earth and reaffirming treaties. Further,
through such an approach settlers can ethically promote the maintenance and use of Indigenous
Traditional Knowledge (TK), which is essential to the goal of maintaining ecological integrity on
these Lands.
Centering Earth
As discussed in chapter four, the Mathur and La Rose cases have effectively bracketed
concern for environmental protection for its own sake as extralegal. These cases have instead
strategically focused on the impacts of climate change on humans. This is reflected in the
damage-centred language regarding Indigenous communities outlined above. The court in these
cases are only being asked to consider legal remedies for impacts that the human communities
will face. Such a framing has the effect of foreclosing an analysis of the relationship between
settlers, Indigenous peoples, and the Land, substituting such an analysis with a simple
examination of the relationship between the settler state and Indigenous peoples.
An examination of Anishinaabe legal theory scholarship259 illustrates how bracketing the
relationship between human communities and the earth outside of the frame within the litigation
of the right to a healthy environment may be inconsistent with Indigenous law. As such, this
framing will be unlikely to foster necessary meaningful partnerships between settlers and
Indigenous peoples to address settler colonialism and promote ecological integrity in Canada. A
259
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prominent example of a call to place the earth at the forefront of partnership efforts is Mills’
theory of rooted constitutionalism. Reconciliation in Mills’ paradigm means listening across
differences, affirming our interdependence and sharing our gifts to meet one another’s need.”260
Mills concludes that:
once we see the other’s rootedness, we see that we can have a good relationship, no matter
the degree of difference in our norms. Of course, having a good relationship can still be a
great deal of hard work. But once we see that we come from and return to the same place,
that we just have different ways of moving through the circle, a good relationship is, at
least, always possible.261
Mills further argues that “if we’re always already connected in relations of deep
interdependence, then the question of freedom is never about standing apart from the other and
always about how to stand with it.”262 Thus, what Mills details is that human societies must
recognize their connection and dependence, or rootedness, to the earth. This rootedness to earth
then must be reflected within constitutional orders. When fully acknowledged this common but
distinct rootedness provides a basis for separate constitutional orders to stand together in
relationship.
This connection, however, does not insinuate that these constitutional orders, or life ways
as Mills identifies, will be subsumed into one singular order. Mills argues that “rooted
constitutionalism rejects any reconciliatory vision calling Indigenous peoples to resign
themselves to violence to their life ways... since there exists no space beyond a life way, such
calls are necessarily also calls for Indigenous peoples to reconcile themselves to the life ways of
another: a relation of power-over.”263 Rooting constitutional orders in the earth can lead to a
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good relationship; however, neither party can be subjected to the constitutional order of the
other.
Mills points to the shortcomings of settler society’s relations with the Earth rather than
taking a damage-centered approach to Indigenous research to explain why reconciliation is so
difficult: “Canadian constitutionalism isn’t a disclosure of the earth way; it finds its origin in a
social contract story.” It recognizes “only earth, not earth way, and as such fail[s] to treat earth as
an always already connected family of beings with whom to stand in relationship. [Settlers]
regard earth only as a set of resources to be used (or preserved) instrumentally.”264 Following
from Mills, the colonial foundations of the Canadian state’s relationship with the earth is central
to its failure to be in good relationship with Indigenous nations in Canada. Further, the
presumptive authority of the Canadian constitutional order leaves no room for relationship with
Indigenous legal orders. Mills’ theory of rooted constitutionalism builds on the work of John
Borrows, who has argued that “reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the [Canadian]
Crown requires our collective reconciliation with the earth. Practices and partnerships of
resurgence and reconciliation must sustain the living earth and our more-than-human relatives
for future generations.”265 Noting the potential for the Canadian state to build on Indigenous
legal orders, Borrows argues “we are earthbound, and our laws and practices must be revitalized
to recognize and respond to this vital fact.”266
The current litigation of the right to a healthy environment however does not do this type
of work to challenge the settler colonial foundations of our relations with the earth. By framing
efforts to combat climate change in terms suitable to fit the settler state’s laws and the
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competencies of the court as an institution, not only is an opportunity to unsettle these relations
lost, but the legitimacy of these institutions to determine our relations with the earth are upheld.
Thus, in forgoing this important work the litigation of the right to a healthy environment may not
only fall short of being able to bring the social change that is being asked for within the legal
arguments, it can also be seen as a an example of settlers imposing their constitutional order, or
life way, onto indigenous peoples, rather than working in partnership and recognizing Indigenous
constitutionalism.
Treaty Law
It is important to note that proponents of the right to a healthy environment litigation may
not think that this is the perfect solution and may recognize the limitations of not including the
relationship to the earth and Indigenous law in the process. Such proponents would likely see
litigating the right as the best choice out of series of flawed options they hope would
immediately force the Canadian government to reverse course and take action on climate change.
As mentioned previously one interviewee described how this type of litigation can be “a huge
breath of fresh air because now it opens another legal avenue that wasn’t there before” within
larger legal campaigns that have exhausted all other avenues to challenge government
decisions.267
However, this perspective overlooks existing treaties with Indigenous peoples, which are
powerful laws at the foundation of the relationship between the settler state, Indigenous peoples,
and the Land, as a potentially fruitful way to push for better environmental protection.
Anishinaabe legal scholar Aimee Craft argues for renewed attention to treaties because
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Indigenous perspectives about treaties “have generally been disregarded by governments and
courts.”268 This is particularly problematic because, as Craft argues, “in order to interpret and
implement a treaty, we look to its spirit and intent and consider what was contemplated by the
parties at the time the treaty was negotiated. Both parties’ understandings of the treaty need to be
taken into account in its interpretation.”269
Although the Canadian government and courts have not engaged in this kind of treaty
interpretation, they do not hold the exclusive power to interpret and implement treaties. Craft
argues that “given that treaties are living, breathing documents built on the foundations of
indigenous laws, courts may not be the ultimate forum for treaty interpretation.”270 Mills also
emphasizes the role of treaties in shifting settler state relations with the earth:
Settler peoples […] harm themselves in founding their political community upon
violence, which slowly destroys it from within. So long as they maintain their earth
alienated constitutional order, which treats non-humans as resources to be exploited,
there is no escape from this fate, although settlers are always welcome to abandon their
current constitutional project and, through treaty, root their political communities in
earth.271
Research on existing treaties demonstrates intentionality to create a connection between
Indigenous peoples, the settler state, and the Land. For example, in researching Treaty One
negotiations Craft determined that “while the Crown has generally proceeded on the basis that
Treaty One was a surrender of land, the record of the negotiations shows that, from the
Anishinaabe perspective, the substantive agreement was to enter into a relationship of mutual
assistance and care, in which land was to be shared with the white settlers.”272 Craft expands on
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this finding stating that “Anishinaabe concepts of sharing, kinship, and responsibility towards the
land are equally important in understanding the approach to the treaty. A balanced and full
understanding of the treaty requires an understanding of the Anishinaabe relationship to the land
and the sacred commitment to share.”273
Similarly, while examining the Dish With One Spoon (a treaty between the Anishinaabe
and Haudenosaunee in the area that it now known as southern Ontario), and the Welcoming and
Sharing Three Figures Sacred Wampum, McGregor concludes that examining these wampum
belts can “help others understand Indigenous Responsibilities to the Earth.”274 McGregor
continues to argue that:
We begin to see the importance of understanding the meaning of these wampum treaties
at multiple levels, including the obligations and responsibilities of the parties required to
ensure the treaties could be honoured (sustained). Such examination reveals that
covenants with the natural world also form part of these treaties, and that, as with the
agreements between nations, these covenants also require the honouring of
responsibilities. Within such a context, TK (Traditional Knowledge) becomes
fundamental to the detailed understanding of these treaties, and in turn of Indigenous
principles of responsibility to the natural world. It is these principles of responsibility
which may be of significant assistance in offering a way forward as we strive to achieve a
sustainable world.275
Anishinaabe legal scholar Leanne Simpson similarly finds that in agreeing to the Dish with One
Spoon treaty both the Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee “parties knew they had a shared
responsibility to take care of the territory, following their own culturally based environmental
ethics to ensure that the plant and animal nations they were so dependent on carried on in a
healthy state in perpetuity.”276
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Another essential relationship governed by treaty comes in the form of the Two Row
Wampum Belt. In Canada’s Indigenous Constitution John Borrows describes this Wampum Belt
as such:
The belt consists of two rows of purple wampum beads on a white background. Three
rows of white beads symbolizing peace, friendship, and respect separate the two purple
rows. The two purple rows symbolize two paths or two vessels travelling down the same
river. One row symbolizes the Haudenosaunee people with their law and customs, while
the other row symbolizes European laws and customs. As nations move together side-byside on the River of Life, they are to avoid overlapping or interfering with one another.277
This Wampum Belt is not only of particular importance due to it being the first wampum belt
shared between Indigenous peoples and settlers, but also because this foundational nature was
reaffirmed in the Treaty of Niagara, 1764. The Treaty of Niagara included the British Crown
presenting the Royal Proclamation, 1763, to Chiefs from twenty-four Indigenous nations, who in
turn presented the Crown with the Two Row Wampum Belt to demonstrate each party’s
understanding of the treaty and the Royal Proclamation.278 As a result, the Royal Proclamation,
which in the Canadian state’s law is the legal basis for all future treaties, must be read in
accordance with the obligations of the Treaty of Niagara and the Two Row Wampum Belt. This
means that all subsequent treaties carry with them the implied obligation to respect the Two Row
Wampum Belt relationship of peace, friendship, respect, and non-interference.279
This type of treaty interpretation then proves to be fruitful for gaining insight into the
means of maintaining proper relationships on this Land. Examining the four treaties detailed
above alone demonstrates that settlers must maintain relationships with not only Indigenous
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peoples, but also the natural world, in ways which recognize the need for kinship, sharing, peace,
friendship, respect, and non-interference.
The importance of looking to treaties is echoed by Ermine as a way to navigate the
“ethical space” between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples: “the treaties still stand as
agreements to co-exist and they set forth certain conditions of engagement between Indigenous
and European nations.” A central theme that emerged from McGregor’s policy research with
“Elders, TK holders and practitioners” in Ontario “is that respect for the spirit and intent of the
treaties should form the basis of the relationships required to achieve co-existence and
knowledge-sharing.”280 According to McGregor “Elders have emphasized that relationships
based on co-existence have already been considered and negotiated, and that approaches and
principles necessary for their establishment have already been accepted by the parties in
treaties.”281 Thus, treaties provide an existing framework from which a renewed pathway to good
relations can be built.
Looking to treaties as the framework for environmental decision making has two major
consequences for the litigation of the right to a healthy environment. First, it might not make
sense to invest scarce time, resources, and public commitment into creating new legal solutions
to change the Canadian government’s behavior while these powerful existing legal obligations
are not being honoured and upheld. As detailed above treaties set out the foundation of the
intended relationship between the settler state, Indigenous peoples, and the Land but Indigenous
perspectives about treaties “have generally been disregarded by governments and courts.”282
Thus, a process of treaty interpretation in partnership with Indigenous peoples could
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fundamentally reshape the settler state’s relationships in ways that litigation through settler
courts cannot. Second, decolonizing the relationships between Indigenous peoples, the state, and
the Land through reaffirming treaty law pushes us to look beyond the settler legal system. As
such, it provides a way to strengthen these relationships in ways that foster the values proponents
of litigating the right to a healthy environment seek to advance. Overlooking treaty law to instead
ask the Canadian courts to create new solutions to combat climate change reinforces the notion
that the Canadian state is the appropriate body to govern these issues. Thus, litigating the right to
a healthy environment may both delay desperately needed change in the relationship between
settlers, Indigenous peoples, and the Land while simultaneously reinforcing the settler state’s
one-sided interpretation of the treaties.
Traditional Knowledge
One of the main benefits of the treaty law approach in the context of environmental
advocacy is that it would support Indigenous peoples to restore intended relationships with the
Land, and thus fulfill the responsibilities that arise from this relationship. Ensuring that
Indigenous peoples are able to live in accordance with their own legal orders and obligations is
important from both a social and ecological justice perspective. As noted above, Indigenousowned and managed land has better environmental outcomes.283 This trend has been linked to
place-based Indigenous Traditional Knowledge (TK)284 and systems of governance. In the
context of water governance, McGregor argues that “First Nations peoples do want TK to form
an integral part of water governance as they feel that the insights and values that TK would bring
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to the dialogue are missing. In fact, many Elders, TK holders and practitioners have asserted that
the lack of TK may account for why current water protection efforts continue to fail.”285 As she
notes, the willingness to share this knowledge is qualified by the need for meaningful partnership
and respect for Indigenous knowledge: “the status quo in terms of incorporating TK in water
governance is not considered acceptable and is not respectful of treaty relationships with First
Nations.”286 Currently “in Canada, we have progressed to the point where the discourse now
routinely contains references to TK and the protection of Aboriginal rights. In practice, however,
the implementation of such ideas has yet to be achieved in a meaningful way.”287 Writing about
Indigenous approaches to climate change, Whyte similarly observes that “many Indigenous
persons are understandably concerned that climate scientists will intentionally or naively clamor
around Indigenous communities to exploit the information Indigenous knowledges might possess
that could fill in gaps in climate science research.”288 As McGregor argues, this tendency of
settlers to simply take or extract “TK from the community and inserting what is deemed relevant
into environmental management regimes (the ‘knowledge extraction paradigm’) is an approach
that is failing all parties.”289
This is not only a practical failure in terms of ecological outcomes, it also results in the
“depoliticizing” of TK.290 Simpson argues that “by depoliticizing we lose a potential opportunity
to transform and to decolonize settler society, and it is the transformative potential of the
processes and concepts embodied in Indigenous Knowledge systems that hold the greatest
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possibility for this kind of change.”291 According to McGregor “what is needed is commitment to
these initiatives, so that Aboriginal peoples may begin once again to live their responsibilities to
the natural world.”292
The litigation of the right to a healthy environment, as it is currently constructed in the
climate change lawsuits described above, does not demonstrate a commitment to the initiatives
that Simpson and McGregor highlight. Instead it focuses on asking a settler institution, which is
simultaneously responsible for eroding TK and is not capable of accessing TK, to lead social
change in promoting ecological integrity. The inability of the right to promote the use of TK on
this Land further limits its potential efficacy. Conversely, the process of reforming the
relationship between the settler state and Indigenous peoples through centering the earth and
reaffirming treaty relationships could provide a key promoting the use of TK, as these are acts
that actively confront the legacy of colonialism.
Current Efforts
The goal of reorienting the relationship between the settler state, Indigenous peoples, and
the Land will take time, resources, and commitment to realize. As a result “First Nations are not
waiting for government recognition and continue to collaborate with others to realize their
responsibilities.”293 ENGOs then can play an important role in this type of relationship building,
and indeed some Canadian ENGO’s are currently in the process of doing so. One interviewee
argued that “it isn’t even really possible to be an effective environmental practitioner without
working with Indigenous nations who hold so much power in terms of how decision making
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happens.”294 As a result of this recognition the interviewee’s organization “is in the midst of a
shift and [they] don’t know where that will take [them], but [they] are trying to take that
openness and trying to be comfortable about not being as in control by being able to map out the
directions but have it be informed by the relationships that we are building with [their]
Indigenous colleagues and friends.”295 The organization’s goal of engaging in this Indigenous led
work is to better understand what it means “to live on [Indigenous] territory in a bi-legal
relationship between human and non-human beings that are governed by [Indigenous] law and to
invite settlers to begin to think that through.”296
It can be argued that this course of action, being work that would continue in perpetuity
and will develop in unpredictable ways, also fails to deliver the rapid changes I have critiqued
the right to a healthy environment for being unable to deliver. An important distinction however,
as detailed earlier, is that the litigation of the right to a healthy environment is being presented to
the public as a course of action which can help prevent climate change. In contrast, the
relationship building approach is being presented to the public as a strategy with no fixed term.
This is crucial as the messaging for the relationship building approach asks the public to commit
to a project of relationship building, and to remain committed in order to maintain any positive
results. As a result, the successes of the relationship building approach would not face the same
risk of advocates relaxing their efforts that litigation does.
Furthermore, as detailed in the previous chapter, courts and judges deciding the right to a
healthy environment are likely to be unwilling or unable to lead the social change proponents of
the litigation are asking them to. As a result, the relationship building strategy, although a long-
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term strategy, offers the potential to lead social change by reshaping relationships between
settlers, Indigenous peoples, and the Land in a manner that litigation cannot. The decolonizing
work described above is already happening and is a course of action available to other advocates
and organizations willing to build meaningful partnerships and take the lead from Indigenous
communities and organizations. ENGOs must critically consider whether to invest in costly legal
battles such as litigating the right to a healthy environment which could create real barriers to
investing in and committing to this type of transformative change, while furthering a solution
that will be inextricably bound up in the legacy of settler colonialism.
Summary
In this thesis I analyzed scholarship, court documents, ENGO fundraising material, and
interviews with senior members of ENGOs in order to determine whether litigating the right to a
healthy environment in Canada could advance the ecological values that its proponents are
seeking to promote.
In answering this question I identified Mathur, La Rose, and the pending Wet’suwet’en
case as current efforts to litigate the right to a healthy environment in Canada. In the introductory
chapter I analyzed the initial claims made by the ENGOs supporting these cases (Ecojustice, the
David Suzuki Foundation, and RAVEN trust respectively), as well as the body of Canadian
environmental law scholarship which forwards the argument for such litigation. I additionally
argued that the legacy of settler colonialism in inextricably present within the settler legal
systems and thus any litigation efforts made through said system. I argued that these influences
thus underlie each stage of the process of transforming values into legal rights.
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In the literature review I presented relational approaches to law as a guiding framework
for the thesis. I then consolidated bodies of scholarship on two sites of intervention within any
legal dispute: lawyers’ input and judicial interpretation.
In chapter four I began my analysis by examining the impact of lawyers on the
expression of the right to a healthy environment. Following Nedelsky’s relational rights model I
identified the values that proponents of the right to a healthy environment are seeking to
advance. I then compared these values against the initial arguments in Mathur and La Rose. In
doing so I determined that the lawyers in those cases made the strategic choice to focus on the
impacts of climate change on humans while discussing their clients’ legal interests, whereas the
clients’ concern for the maintenance of ecological systems for their own sake was “placed
outside the frame” of the legal argument as an extralegal concern. In observing this transaction I
concluded that the lawyers in these cases fundamentally transformed and translated the
arguments for the right to a healthy environment, and thus have had a profound effect on the
potential legal expression of the right.
The potential effect of the judicial interpretation of the right to a healthy environment was
my focus in chapter five. In doing so I applied Rosenberg’s constrained court theory, coloured
for the Canadian context by Lessard’s data on Charter disposition, as well as Petter and
Hutchinsons’ critiques of the Charter. In doing so I found that there is little reason to believe that
Canadian courts will be willing or able to lead social change by granting proactive remedies to
prevent climate change. This prediction was supported by a review of the history of rights-based
broad redistribution claims, by critical legal studies claims about judges-as-property-owningwealthy elites who are unlikely to be motivated to support broadly redistributive forms of
change, from the structure of the Charter itself, and the from court’s lack of implementation
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powers including the threat of legislatures invoking the notwithstanding clause in section 33 of
the Charter.
I further analyzed what I deemed to be reactive remedies that were being sought in the
litigation of the right to a healthy environment including the desire to create a larger impetus for
administrative actors to make decisions which promote ecological integrity, as well as the desire
to create a “constitutional backstop” to prevent new governments from repealing and regressing
environmental gains made by the previous administration. I argued that the attempt to use
Charter litigation to address administrative decisions was misguided as such litigation does not
confront the most important consideration, namely it does not challenge who has the authority to
make these administrative decisions. On the other hand, I conceded that the idea of establishing a
constitutional backstop may help the maintenance of ecological integrity in Canada. However,
this gain would only garner long term benefits, or only reactive remedies in the short term.
Unfortunately, this shortcoming would likely outweigh the benefit it would confer. I base this
argument in part on my observation that it is likely that the court would prefer to recognize a
limited right to a healthy environment (i.e. one that could only be used as a constitutional
backstop) in order to avoid the public questioning of the role of the court that might follow an
outright denial of any right to a healthy environment. This potential recognition of a limited right
becomes problematic when combined with the messaging to the public that the litigants had “no
other choice” but to litigate and that the right to a healthy environment would play a significant
role in addressing climate change. The issue, I argue, is that because a narrow legal right to a
healthy environment would not adequately protect the values that the litigants originally sought
to protect the right could be misinterpreted by the non-legally trained public as a significant
victory in the fight to prevent climate change, thus inducing supporters of the litigation to relax
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their efforts (including providing funding support, prioritizing climate change as an issue when
voting etc.) as they may perceive that the emergency they originally fought against will no longer
exist.
In the beginning of this chapter I examined future pathways for efforts to address climate
change in Canada which could fully advance ecological values, and avoid reinforcing the settler
state and its assumed authority over environmental governance. In doing so I explored centring
earth and relationship to earth in mediating the relationship between settlers and Indigenous
peoples, as well as the need to reaffirm treaties which to date have been interpreted in a one
sided fashion which benefits only the settler state as potential transformative actions. I argued
that by engaging in these acts settler environmental activists could help ensure the promotion and
use of Indigenous TK which is essential to efforts to enhance ecological integrity in Canada.
The main finding of this research then is that in the process of arriving at a right to a
healthy environment as a legal mechanism the interventions of lawyers and judges will narrow
the intended scope of the right. I contend that this narrowing would result in the potential legal
right not fully reflecting the values that its proponents sought to advance, and thus would limit its
efficacy as a tool to promote ecological integrity and to combat climate change.
I further identified two consequences of this divide between the legal right and the values
it is intended to advance. The first of these consequences is that there is serious risk that a
potential right to a healthy environment will be misinterpreted by the public as a greater victory
than it may be, especially in the context of climate change. Taken together, the impact of lawyers
and of judicial interpretation suggest that in order to fit the demands of the legal system a
potential right to a healthy environment will be significantly altered from the values its
proponents originally desired to protect. The changes that the right undergoes during this process
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will not be easily cognizable to the non-legally trained public, especially when combined with
the public messaging from ENGOs that there was “no other choice” or that the litigation is an
important part of a climate change strategy. As stated many times throughout this paper, this
result could have the unintended consequence of causing members of the non-legally trained
public who are committed to fighting climate change to relax their efforts after being lulled into
the false belief that the right can and will result in social change or on the ground change.
The second consequence is that the litigation of the legal right to a healthy environment is
an important strategic choice that can foreclose work on other strategies to address climate
change. The litigation of the right to a healthy environment detracts from investment in efforts to
substantially change the settler state’s relationship to the Indigenous peoples and the earth. The
act of forgoing such work in favour of litigating has the unintended effect of implicitly
reinforcing the settler state and its assumed authority to deal with these issues.
Ultimately, I anticipate that one of these right to a healthy environment cases will be
successful at trial and throughout the appeal process. Whether such a decision will be able to
improve Canada’s response to climate change and ecological integrity more broadly remains to
be seen.
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